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Abstract
Data privacy in traditional wireless communications is accomplished by cryptography tech-
niques at the upper layers of the protocol stack. This thesis aims at contributing to the
critical security issue residing in the physical-layer of wireless networks, namely, secrecy rate
in various transmission environments. Physical-layer security opens the gate to the exploita-
tion of channel characteristics to achieve data secure transmission.
Precoding techniques, as a critical aspect in pre-processing signals prior to transmission has
become an effective approach and recently drawn significant attention in the literature. In
our research, novel non-linear precoders are designed focusing on the improvement of the
physical-layer secrecy rate with consideration of computational complexity as well as the Bit
Error Ratio (BER) performance. In the process of designing the precoder, strategies such
as Lattice Reduction (LR) and Artificial Noise (AN) are employed to achieve certain design
requirements.
The deployment and allocation of resources such as relays to assist the transmission also have
gained significant interest. In multiple-antenna relay networks, we examine various relay se-
lection criteria with arbitrary knowledge of the channels to the users and the eavesdroppers.
Furthermore, we provide novel effective relay selection criteria that can achieve a high secrecy
rate performance. More importantly they do not require knowledge of the channels of the
eavesdroppers and the interference.
Combining the jamming technique with resource allocation of relay networks, we investigate
an opportunistic relaying and jamming scheme for Multiple-Input Multiple-Output (MIMO)
buffer-aided downlink relay networks. More specifically, a novel Relaying and Jamming Func-
tion Selection (RJFS) algorithm as well as a buffer-aided RJFS algorithm are developed along
with their ability to achieve a higher secrecy rate. Relying on the proposed relay network,
we detail the characteristics of the system, under various relay selection criteria, develop ex-
haustive search and greedy search-based algorithms, with or without inter-relay Interference
Cancellation (IC).
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Preface
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wireless networks. Proved by Shannon’s theory and established by A. D. Wyner, this new
approach known as physical-layer security draws great attention since it is posed. Compared
with traditional cryptography techniques, it provides a more efficient and reliable way to
achieve transmission security.
This dissertation should be of interest to wireless secure transmission developers
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Motivation
Around our life, changes are happening at every second. We are stepping into a “Wireless”
world. Talking to each other through thousands of miles away is no longer a dream. Traveling
around the world can be guided by the Global Positioning System (GPS). Looking back to
the development of wireless communications, people are always seeking faster, more reliable
and more convenient ways to send messages. Among all the demands, transmission security
is an unavoidable critical aspect.
In daily life, people put the information into a locked box before transmission to keep the
privacy of message. This can also be regarded as a secure transmission system. Inspired by
the idea of using a key and a locker, the conventional wireless secure transmission in essence
performs in the same way. The ‘box’ in wired or wireless transmission is created with different
types of encryption techniques, for example, the most common email encryption techniques
are called PKI (Public Key Infrastructure), WEP (Wired Equivalent Privacy) used to secure
IEEE 802.11 wireless networks as well as WPA (Wi-Fi Protected Access) developed to pro-
vide stronger security. The ‘key’ is created using an encryption or a decryption algorithm to
lock or unlock the ‘box’. Based on the type of keys, traditional cryptography can be divided
into symmetric key cryptography (also known as shared key cryptography) and public key
cryptography. The security level of this kind of encryption significantly depends on the en-
cryption algorithm used to generate the keys.
14
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Although the traditional encryptions have great performance in reality, theoretically given
unlimited computing power, these encryptions can still be broken. Is there existing a secure
technique theoretically unbreakable? To achieve information-theoretically secure transmis-
sion, scientists are trying to develop a crypto-system with the capability of achieving security
derived from information theory. This means that it cannot be broken even when the adver-
sary has unlimited computing power.
Future development in computing power brings great challenges to the traditional encryption
protocols, but information-theoretic security does not rely its effectiveness on assumptions
about computational hardness, which makes it not vulnerable to such challenges. The con-
cept of information-theoretically secure communication was introduced in 1949 by Claude
Shannon, who proved the feasibility of secure transmission in physical layer from the view-
point of information theory. In cryptography, if a cipher text produced using it provides no
information about the plaintext without knowledge of the key, we say it is perfectly secure.
In common transmissions, information-theoretic security communications is not necessary to
be perfectly secure. It can tolerate a certain level of leakage of information.
Under the inspiration of information-theoretic security, A. D. Wyner in his initial physical-
layer security work [1] in the 1970s described the wiretap channel. By utilizing the physical
wireless channel, Wyner maintained the security properties by communications, signal pro-
cessing and coding techniques. The details of the problem is described as Alice wants to send
a message to Bob without Eve decoding it. It was shown that if the channel from Alice to
Bob is statistically better than the channel from Alice to Eve, secure transmission is possible.
The most critical point in his work is that Wyner defines the secrecy capacity as the rate at
which Alice can transmit secret information to Bob. Shortly after, Csiszar and Korner [2]
found that the assumption in Wyner’s work that Bob has statistically better channel to Alice
than did Eve can be released without destroying secret transmission. More recently, secrecy
capacity and optimal power allocation in broadcast fading channels becomes popular in the
physical-layer security research. Among which, the knowledge of the channels from Alice to
Eve is always an unavoidable assumption. If the knowledge can be obtained or is available,
Alice could simply place a null in Eves direction.
Less theoretically than the seminal papers in the field, new schemes have been proposed
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attempting to assist the existing secure transmission. One physical-layer security scheme is
to broadcast artificial noise in all directions except that of Bobs channel, basically jamming
Eve. One paper by Goel and Negi [3] details the implementation, and Khisti and Wornell [4]
compute the secrecy capacity when only statistics about Eves channel are known. Secrecy
capacity for MIMO and multiple colluding eavesdroppers is more recent and ongoing work,
and these results still make the non-useful assumption about eavesdropper channel state
information knowledge.
1.2 Problems and Contributions
1.2.1 Problems
In more recent works, secrecy capacity is investigated with different precoding techniques.
The secrecy capacity with linear precoding algorithm such as zero-forcing (ZF), minimum
mean square error (MMSE) and block diagonalization (BD) are investigated in various sce-
narios [5; 6; 7]. Then in MISO scenario, robust secure transmission is investigated [8; 4].
Following the MISO scenario, the closed-form expression of secrecy capacity for some special
MIMO scenario is carried out [9]. However the secrecy capacity of general MIMO scenarios
is still an open problem.
As aforementioned, resource allocation is one of the directions of physical-layer security re-
search. Different resource allocation will have various effects on the system. For example,
power allocation will give the optimal performance in terms of transmission rate of the in-
vestigated system [10]. In ongoing works, the selection of relays shows great advantage in
assisting with fading in wireless communications [11]. So far, there are few important works
considering physical-layer security in systems with selection of relays [12; 13].
The jamming problem is another critical aspect. The combination of jamming techniques
and selection of relays is a novel topic in the physical-layer security research [14; 15; 16].
1.2.2 Contributions
Associated with the problems posed, the contribution in this dissertation can be divided into
three aspects. First, to improve the secrecy rate performance, we study and propose novel
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non-linear precoding algorithms and also some extended versions with an improvement in
specific performance metric. Secondly, for the selection of relays, effective relay selection
criteria are developed to achieve high secrecy rate performance in relay systems. In the last
contribution, a jamming technique is combined with relay networks to provide a superior
secrecy rate performance.
Design of non-linear precoder
We develop and study successive optimization Tomlinson-Harashima precoding (SO-THP)
algorithms based on the generalized MMSE channel inversion (GMI) approach reported in
[17]. Specifically, the proposed non-linear precoders exploit both successive interference can-
cellation, lattice-reduction and block diagonalization, which can impose near-orthogonality
between the channels of the desired users. The major contributions are summarized as follows:
• A multiuser MIMO downlink network is constructed in the presence of multiple eaves-
droppers.
• Novel non-linear precoding technique, namely, SO-THP+GMI is proposed in MU-
MIMO downlink wireless network. SO-THP+GMI algorithm combines the SO-THP
precoding with the GMI technique to maintain an outstanding secrecy rate with re-
duced computational complexity.
• SO-THP+GMI precoding algorithm is extended to a S-GMI version which we call
SO-THP+S-GMI algorithm. SO-THP+S-GMI algorithm can further reduce the com-
putational complexity.
• Based on aforementioned SO-THP+S-GMI algorithm, lattice-reduction (LR) strategy
is employed to achieve full receive diversity and artificial noise (AN) strategy is applied
to contribute to a further secrecy rate improvement.
• Secrecy rate analysis of proposed non-linear precoding algorithms is carried out along
with an assessment of their computational complexity.
• When different power levels are allocated to generate artificial noise, an analysis of the
power ratio which can achieve the optimal value in terms of secrecy rate is given.
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Effective relay selection criteria
We investigate the physical-layer security performance in a multiuser MIMO downlink relay
network. With arbitrary knowledge of the channels to users and the eavesdroppers, we
examine the effect of applying different relay selection criteria on the secrecy rate performance.
Then novel effective relay selection algorithms which can achieve high secrecy rate is proposed
without the knowledge of the channels to the eavesdroppers. The main contributions include:
• The structure of a multiuser MIMO downlink relay network with linear precoding tech-
niques.
• Examine the effect of applying max-ratio criterion, SINR criterion as well as Secrecy-
Rate (SR) criterion on physical-layer secrecy rate in single antenna and MIMO scenar-
ios.
• Derivation of the proposed Simplified SINR-Based (S-SINR) relay selection criterion
with linear precoding. The S-SINR criterion requires only the channels of the legitimate
users and can achieve close secrecy rate performance to the full knowledge information
SINR criterion.
• Derivation of the proposed Simplified SR-Based (S-SR) relay selection criterion with
linear precoding. The S-SR criterion eliminates the requirement of the information of
channels to the eavesdroppers and has almost the similar level of secrecy rate perfor-
mance to the full knowledge information SR criterion.
• The proposed S-SINR criterion and S-SR criterion are compatible with rank-deficient
systems.
Opportunistic relaying and jamming scheme
Opportunistic relaying and jamming select scheme and algorithms are investigated in MIMO
buffer-aided downlink relay networks. The opportunistic scheme is combined with a jamming
technique to improve the secrecy rate performance. In the opportunistic scheme, the problem
of inter-relay interference cancellation is concerned with a comparison between implementing
the interference cancellation or not. Computational complexity of the algorithms also consider
a solution of employing a greedy search in the relay selection. The main contributions are:
• An opportunistic multiuser MIMO downlink buffer-aided relay network is constructed
with linear precoding techniques.
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• Novel Relaying and Jamming Function Selection (RJFS) algorithm is proposed to con-
tributed to the secrecy rate performance and a buffer-aided RJFS algorithm is further
developed with noisy signals stored in the buffers. The buffer-aided system is capable
of achieving higher secrecy rate by requiring extra computational complexity.
• In the opportunistic scheme, inter-relay interference is an unavoidable issue. In our
work we study the feasibility of implementing interference cancellation (IC) at relay
nodes and compare the effect on secrecy rate performance with or without IC.
• In both proposed algorithms, computational complexity is a critical point. To reduce
the algorithm complexity, a greedy search is developed for use instead of an exhaustive
search. With the cooperation between the greedy search and proposed relay selection
algorithm, high secrecy rate performance is maintained with reduced computational
complexity.
1.3 Thesis Outline
In Chapter 2, a comprehensive literature review is provided. Not only the concept of physical-
layer security from the view of information theory but also some less theoretical techniques
such as lattice reduction (LR) and artificial noise (AN). A brief introduction of our work
which relies on the development of introduced techniques is given along with summaries of
novel algorithms.
In Chapter 3, a multiuser MIMO downlink system is constructed and novel non-linear precod-
ing algorithms which contribute to the secrecy rate performance are introduced. In addition,
some extended version of non-linear precoding algorithms are shown with concurrent consid-
eration of various requirements in wireless transmission, namely, computational complexity,
bit error ratio (BER).
Chapter 4 includes a design of effective relay selection criterion in multiple antenna relay net-
works. Novel relay selection criteria are proposed aiming at secrecy rate improvement. Based
on which, Further simplified criteria research focus on the elimination of the knowledge of
the channels to the eavesdroppers. Eventually, novel simplified criteria are developed main-
taining the secrecy rate performance without knowledge of the channels to the eavesdroppers.
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In Chapter 5, an opportunistic scheme as well as a jamming technique are combined to achiev-
ing high secrecy rate performance in a buffer-aided relay network. Details of the opportunistic
scheme with consideration of inter-relay interference cancellation and jamming process with
jammer nodes are given in the construction of the system, based on which the Relaying and
Jamming Function Selection (RJFS) algorithm as well as its buffer-aided version are proposed.
In Chapter 6, a summary of our work, conclusions and a brief discussion of future work,
which is of great interest in physical-layer security research are given based on the obtained
results.
1.4 Notation
Bold uppercase letters A ∈ CM×N denote matrices with size M ×N and bold lowercase
letters a ∈ CM×1 denote column vectors with length M . Conjugate, transpose, and conjugate
transpose are represented by (·)∗, (·)T and (·)H , respectively; IM is the identity matrix of
size M ×M ; diag{a} denotes a diagonal matrix with the elements of the vector a along
its diagonal; CN (0, σ2n) represents complex Gaussian random variables with independent and
identically distributed (i.i.d) entries with zero mean and variance equal to σ2n. log(·) denotes
the base-2 logarithm of the argument.
Chapter 2
Literature Review
2.1 Introduction
This Chapter presents a literature review of recent developments in physical-layer security
research. Major definitions as well as applied techniques throughout the history of physical-
layer security are also illustrated according to the original works by[1; 18; 2; 3]. First of all,
the application of physical-layer security is introduced and the performance metrics are given
with the help of a wire-tap channel model. Following this, transmit processing techniques
are presented with its potential of assisting physical-layer security transmission. Then, a
review of resource allocation involving relays are given along with the consideration of buffers
implemented in the relay nodes. Finally, jamming techniques are introduced to achieve further
improvement in security performance.
2.2 Applications
Recently, rapid development of novel security technique in wireless communications is moti-
vated by advanced eavesdropping techniques. Physical-layer security, as a more efficient and
practical way of ensuring wireless transmission security, is developed to realize the desire of
protecting information privacy. By taking advantage of wireless characteristics of the chan-
nels, physical-layer security contributes to further development in wireless networks. Based
on its properties, physical-layer security techniques have great potential of application in the
following aspects:
• Military applications: communication systems play an important role in modern mili-
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tary operations. Traditional cryptography techniques are challenged by unimaginable
computing power developments such as quantum computers. In this context, physical-
layer security gives an idea of providing wireless communications with privacy even
under unlimited computing power eavesdropping.
• Commercial applications: wireless payments as an advanced technique are popular and
convenient in our life. During the payment processing, important personal data, such
as order details, bank account information is easily leaked to eavesdroppers. Physical-
layer security is capable of dealing with such personal information protection issues,
especially in the processing through wireless networks.
• Home applications: wireless communications enable the implementation of modern net-
works such as wireless sensor networks (WSN), internet of things (IoT) in our daily life.
However, data from or to sensors or general devices is transmitted without protection.
Physical-layer security provides the capability of secure data transmission in modern
networks.
Overall, physical-layer security is compatible with existing wireless transmission systems.
With low cost in implementation and excellent performance of data protection, it has great
potential for deployment in future wireless communication networks.
2.3 Channel Modeling and System Models
2.3.1 Diversity and Multiplexing
MIMO Diversity
Developed from Single-Input Single-Output (SISO) systems, Single-Input Multiple-Output
(SIMO) systems and Multiple-Input Single-Output (MISO) systems show their ability of
achieving more reliable wireless transmission in fading channels. In SIMO systems, receive
diversity can be used via multiple receive antennas seeing independently faded versions of
the same signal [19]. The received signals are combined to obtain a resulting signal with
considerably reduced fading. The maximum receive diversity order is equal to the number
receive antennas. Similarly, in MISO systems, transmit diversity is achieved by transmitting
a symbol through multiple fading paths. Therefore the maximum transmit diversity order is
equal to the number of transmit antennas [20]. For a general MIMO system, with Nr receive
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antennas and Nt transmit antennas, the maximum diversity order can be obtained by,
D = Nt ×Nr (2.1)
where each pair of transmit antenna and receive antenna has independently fading.
MIMO Multiplexing
In spatial multiplexing, multiple low-rate signals are multiplexed over a single high-rate link.
According to [21], Foschini has proved that in high SNR-regime the capacity of a channel
with Rayleigh fading for each transmit and receive antenna can be expressed as:
C(SNR) = min{Nt, Nr} log SNR +O(1) (2.2)
where SNR is the signal-to-noise ratio. For a Bell Laboratory Layered Space-Time (BLAST)
system, according to [22], the multiplexing order can be obtained using:
rmux = min{Nt, Nr} (2.3)
The multiplexing configuration can also be employed in a multiuser system.
2.3.2 Channel Modeling
In wireless communications, the characteristics of the wireless channel include the fading,
which might adversely affect signal transmission. The fading happens due to the reflecting,
scattering and diffracting of the signal. As a result, the received signals will suffer from fluc-
tuating in amplitude, phase and angle which is called multi-path fading. In [23], considering
path loss, shadowing fading and multi-path fading, the envelop of the received signal follows
a Rayleigh density function given as:
f(x) =
2x
Ω
e−
x2
Ω u(x), (2.4)
where Ω is the average power of received signal and u(x) is the step function. We restrict the
channel model to Rayleigh fading in our work for simplicity but we note that the techniques
proposed can also be used for other fading scenarios.
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2.3.3 System Model
1
2
Nt
1
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Nr
Nt antennas transmitter Nr antennas receiver
h1,1
h1,2
h1,Nr
h2,1
h2,2
h2,Nr
hNt,1
hNt,2
hNt,Nr
Figure 2.1: SU-MIMO channel model with Nt transmit antennas and Nr receive antennas
In MIMO systems, a single-user MIMO (SU-MIMO) system is a critical example. SU-MIMO
systems have been investigated with an Nt multiple antenna transmitter and an Nr multiple
antenna receiver as illustrated in Figure 2.1. The vector s represents the transmit data, y
denotes the received signal and sˆ is the estimated data. The statistical channel expressed as:
H(τ, t) =
L−1∑
l=0
Al(t)δ(τ − τl), (2.5)
where Al(t) denotes the lth path between transmitter and receiver. If hi,j(τ, t) which denotes
a function of the fading coefficient is employed, we can express the channel matrix as:
H(τ, t) =

h1,1(τ, t) h1,2(τ, t) h1,3(τ, t) . . . h1,Nt(τ, t)
h2,1(τ, t) h2,2(τ, t) h2,3(τ, t) . . . h2,Nt(τ, t)
...
...
...
. . .
...
hNr,1(τ, t) hNr,2(τ, t) hNr,3(τ, t) . . . hNr,Nt(τ, t)
 (2.6)
Given the transmit signal vector s ∈ CNt×1, the received signal can be described by,
y(t) = H(τ, t) ∗ s(t) + n(t), (2.7)
where n(t) is the Gaussian noise. In a flat-fading channel, as the output is independent of
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inputs at a previous time instant, the received signal can be expressed as:
y = Hs+ n (2.8)
Equation 2.8 gives a general expression of the received signal for a SU-MIMO system experi-
encing flat-fading channel. During the transmission, spatial correlation caused by the limited
scattering and insufficient spacing between adjacent antennas are described with a correlated
channel matrix which is expressed by
Hc = Rr
1
2HRt
1
2 (2.9)
where Rr and Rt are receive and transmit covariance matrices with Tr(Rr) = Nr and
Tr(Rt) = Nt. Both Rr and Rt are positive semi-definite Hermitian matrices. For the case
of an urban wireless environment, the UE is always surrounded by rich scattering objects and
the channel is most likely independent Rayleigh fading at the receive side. Hence, we assume
Rr = INr , and we have
Hc = HRt
1
2 (2.10)
To study the effect of antenna correlations, random realizations of correlated channels are
generated according to the exponential correlation model such that the elements of Rt are
given by
Rt(i, j) =

rj−i if i ≤ j
r∗j,i if i > j
, |r| ≤ 1 (2.11)
where r is the correlation coefficient between any two neighbouring antennas.
Multiuser MIMO System Model
In Figure 2.2, a description of the downlink of a multiuser MIMO (MU-MIMO) system is
given. In this scenario, the transmitter broadcasts signals to M users. We can regard the
MU-MIMO system as a combination of T SU-MIMO systems. As a result, the total channel
matrix H ∈ CMNr×Nt and precoding matrix P ∈ CNt×MNr can be obtained as
H = [HT1 H
T
2 · · · HTM ]T (2.12)
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Figure 2.2: MU-MIMO channel model with one transmitter and M users. The source node
is equipped with Nt antennas and the rth user is equipped with Nr receive antennas.
and
P = [P 1 P 2 · · · PM ] (2.13)
For the rth user, the channel and precoding matrices can be expressed as Hr ∈ CNr×Nt and
P r ∈ CNt×Nr respectively. The received signal for user r in flat-fading channel is obtained as
yr = HrP rsr +
M∑
j=1,j 6=r
HrP jsj + nr, (2.14)
where
∑M
j=1,j 6=rHrP jsj denotes the interference between different users.
Multiuser MIMO System Model with Relays
Due to the broadcast nature of radio wave, fading effects lead to an unreliable transmission
especially for a long distance communication. To support the wireless transmission which
suffers fading effects, relays are implemented between the transmitter and the receivers to
compensate for the signal attenuation. Compared with direct transmission, relay systems
divide the transmission into two parts. According to Figure 2.3, based on a MU-MIMO
system, multiple-antenna relays are placed between the transmitter and users. If we assume
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• Total number of receive antennas: MNr
• Employed transmit antennas at relay nodes: Nrd
• Employed receive antennas at relay nodes: Nsr
Figure 2.3: T relays are placed in a MU-MIMO channel model. The ith relay is equipped
with Ni antennas.
each relay is equipped with Ni antennas and T relays are applied, to transmit signals to M
users, the required number of relay antennas should satisfy TNi ≥MNr. Then we use Nrd =
MNr, which represents the number of antennas used at relays to forward signals to users and
Nsr = Nrd denotes the number of antennas applied to receive signals from the transmitter.
With the total channel from the transmitter to the relays given as Hsr ∈ CNsr×Nt , the
received signal at the relays ysr ∈ CNsr×1 is expressed as:
ysr = HsrP srs+ nsr. (2.15)
Given the total channel matrix from the relays to the users Hrd ∈ CMNr×Nrd , the received
signals at all users y ∈ CMNr×1 can be obtained as:
y = HrdP rdysr + nrd (2.16)
In (2.15) and (2.16), the precoding matrices P sr and P rd are implemented at the source
and at the relays, respectively. The details of how to obtain these matrices can be found in
[24; 25].
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2.4 Performance Metrics
In this thesis, the proposed techniques are developed and evaluated with the comparison to
existing ones in terms of several metrics of particular relevance. Based on the properties of the
constructed communication systems, in our work we have adopted the following metrics: the
secrecy capacity and the associated secrecy rates, the bit error ratio and the computational
complexity.
2.4.1 Secrecy Capacity
Since defined in the wire-tap channel model posed by Wyner [1], secrecy capacity became a
critical evaluation value in the measurement of the security level in wireless networks. As
Source Encoder Main Channel Decoder
Wire-tap Channel
zn
ynsk xn
Figure 2.4: Wiretap channel model [1]: Degraded version of the Main channel
depicted in Figure 2.4, the received message yn will pass the wiretap channel which is a
probabilistically degraded version of the main channel. The eavesdropper will observe zn. In
[1], Wyner defined the equivocation rate of the eavesdropper, which is
Re ≤ H(sk; zn)/n, (2.17)
where the conditional entropy H(sk; zn) is the eavesdropper’s equivocation. When the equiv-
ocation rate Re is arbitrarily close to the information rate R, then the optimal R is the
secrecy capcity of the wiretap channel. Starting from the wire-tap channel, Csisz`ar and
Ko¨rner considered a more general non-degraded version in [2], where they obtained a single-
letter characterization of the achievable private message rate, equivocation rate and common
message rate for a two-receiver broadcast channel. The secrecy capacity was defined as
CSecrecy = max
sk→xn→yn,zn
I(sk; yn)− I(sk; zn), (2.18)
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which is achieved by maximizing over all joint probability distributions such that a Markov
chain sk, xn, ynzn is formed. This concept is the fundamental idea for the physical-layer
secrecy rate. Based on dirty-paper coding arguments, the achievable secrecy rate region can
be enhanced by non-causal side information in [26]. This introduces other techniques, such
as artificial noise or interference systems which we will present in the Jamming Techniques
section.
ALICE-BOB-EVE PROBLEM  
Bob
Alice
Eve
Hba
Hea
Transmission Parameter:
- Transmit power: P
- Number of antennas: Nt
- Transmit signal: x
Bob Receiver Parameter:
- Number of antennas: Nr
- Received signal: y
Eve Receiver Parameter:
- Number of antennas: Ne
- Received signal: z
Wireless 
Access Point
Figure 2.5: Wiretap channel model: Alice, Bob and Eve
In Wyner’s work, the wire-tap channel is described. According to Figure 2.5, the channel
from Alice to Bob is usually called the main channel and the transmission to Eve is known as
the wire-tap channel. In single-antenna scenarios, the message sk is encoded into a codeword
xn. The output of the main channel is given by,
yn = hbax
n + nba, (2.19)
where hba is the quasi-static fading coefficient for the main channel and nba represents the
complex Gaussian noise. The received signal at the eavesdropper side is expressed as
zn = heax
n + nea, (2.20)
where hea is the quasi-static fading coefficient for Eve and nea represents the complex Gaus-
sian noise to Eve. Given the power assumption that the total transmit power P satisfies the
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following constraint
1
n
n∑
i=1
E[|x(i)|2] < P, (2.21)
and the power of noise to Bob and Eve is obtained as Nba and Nea respectively, the instan-
taneous signal to noise ratio (SNR) of the main channel from Alice to Bob can be expressed
as:
γba =
P |hba|2
Nba
(2.22)
Similarly, the instantaneous SNR to the eavesdropper is given by,
γea =
P |hea|2
Nea
(2.23)
According to the Shannon-Hartley theorem proved in [27], the channel capacity is expressed
as a function of the bandwidth and the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR). With instantaneous
SNR, the channel capacity of the transmission from Alice to Bob and Eve can be respectively
obtained as:
Cba =
1
2
log(1 + γba) (2.24)
and
Cea =
1
2
log(1 + γea). (2.25)
Taking into account the monotonically increasing property of the log function, we can obtain
the expression for the secrecy capacity:
Csingle−antennasecrecy =

1
2 log(1 + γba)− 12 log(1 + γea) if γba > γea
0 if γba < γea
(2.26)
Due to the development of expressions for the channel capacity in general MIMO networks
and the non-convex property of the secrecy capacity expression, physical-layer security gains
limited improvements in MIMO systems. Recently, research results on MU-MIMO technology
have emerged. In a MIMO system [28], the channel capacity with perfect CSI is defined as:
Cperfect−CSI = E[ max
R;Tr(R)≤1
log(det(I + γHRHH))], (2.27)
where γ is the ratio between transmit power and noise power. The signal covariance matrix
R = V SV H is obtained through Singular Value Decomposition (SVD) of the channel matrix
H = UΣV H along with the optimal power allocation applying the water-filling procedure.
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The scenario in which the CSI is available at the transmitter side is known as Closed-loop (CL)
system. Then in an Open-loop (OL) system, when the CSI is unavailable at the transmitter
and only the statistics of H are known, the transmit energy will be distributed equally to
all transmit antennas. The channel capacity with no CSI means the signal covariance R to
maximize channel capacity is under worst-case statistics. That is R = 1Nt I, if we have Nt
transmitter antennas. So we have the channel capacity as
Cno−CSI = E[log(det(I + γHHH/Nt)), (2.28)
In the OL scenario, the distribution of the channel is assumed known at the transmitter.
According to different equations, we are capable of measuring the physical-layer secrecy rate
in different scenarios.
To improve the decoding accuracy of the wireless channel, different error control codes such
as convolutional coding or BCH coding are implemented. By adding redundancy, these
error control codes are capable of avoiding errors at the receiver side. Furthermore, turbo
coding, LDPC are developed to closely approach the theoretical limits imposed by Shannon’s
theorem. At the same time, turbo coding can provide much lower decoding complexity than
the Viterbi algorithm on the long convolutional codes that would be required for the same
performance.
Relying on the derivation of channel capacity in MIMO scenarios, Oggier and Hassibi [18]
proved the secrecy capacity under the constraints that the power of the noise is equal for Bob
and Eve [18]. This result was obtained as follows:
Csec = max
Rs0
I(Xs;Yi)− I(Xs;Yk)
= max
Rs0,Tr(Rs)=Es
log(det(I +HbaRsH
H
ba))
− log(det(I +HeaRsHHea)),
(2.29)
where in (2.29) I(Xs;Yi) and I(Xs;Yk) represent the mutual information between the trans-
mitter to Bob as well as Eve. Xs, Yi, Yk are the counterparts of different signal symbols.
Rs is the covariance matrix associated with the information signal sr. The quantity Es cor-
responds the total transmit power. The matrices Hba ∈ CN (0, 1) and Hea ∈ CN (0, 1/m)
represent the channel to the users and eavesdroppers, respectively, and m = σ
2
ea
σ2ba
designates
the gain ratio between the main and wire-tap channel. The secrecy capacity is defined as the
maximization of the difference between two mutual information terms. However, in practice
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the channels are usually not perfectly known. This situation known as the imperfect channel
state information (CSI) is discussed in [3]. For the imperfect channel state information Hea,
the distribution of the eavesdroppers’ channel is required by the transmitter.
2.4.2 Bit Error Ratio (BER)
The BER performance is employed to measure the transmission reliability in wireless net-
works. BER is defined as the number of bit errors divided by the total number of transferred
bits during a studied time interval. The BER can be considered as an approximate estimate
of the bit error probability. The BER performance of the system can be improved by error
control codes. By adding redundancy, the received bits can be decoded more accurately.
2.4.3 Computational Complexity
In assessing the computational complexity, the number of Floating-Point Operations Per
Second (FLOPS) is used as a measurement of the cost of an algorithm. In [29], the FLOPS
for real QR, SVD and complex QR algorithms are given. 2 FLOPS are needed for a real
multiplication with one addition, while for a complex multiplication with one addition it
accounts for 8 FLOPS.
According to [30] for an m × n complex matrix A ,the FLOPS of the SVD of the complex
matrix A are equivalent to its 2m × 2n extended real matrix. The SVD of the matrix is
A = UΣV H , where U and V are unitary matrices and Σ is a diagonal matrix containing
the singular values of matrix A.
 Ar Ai
−Ai Ar
 =
U r U i
U i −U r
Σ 0
0 Σ
V Tr V Ti
V Ti −V Tr
 (2.30)
The number of FLOPS of the multiplication, the QR decomposition, the matrix inversion as
well as SVD with different matrices obtained have been reported in [30]. Some of them are
given in Table 2.1.
2.5. Transmit Processing Strategies 33
Table 2.1: Computational Complexity of Some Common Operations
Operation Type of matrix Size of matrix FLOPs
Multiplication Complex m× n and q × p 8mnqp
QR decomposition Complex m× n 16(n2m− nm2 + 1/3m3)
SVD where only Σ Complex m× n 32(nm2 + 2m3)
and V obtained
SVD all matrix obtained Complex m× n 8(4n2m+ 8nm2 + 9m3)
Inversion Real m×m 2m3 − 2m2 +m
2.5 Transmit Processing Strategies
In a multiuser dowlink network, transmit processing is applied to mitigate multiuser inter-
ference. Precoding techniques are used in the downlink of a cellular network. According
to the channel information between the transmitter and receiver, appropriate weightings are
generated before the transmission to achieve the maximization of a particular metric of the
system. These weights form the precoding matrix and the particular metric can be the re-
ceived signal power for a single-steam transmission or the total throughput for a multiuser
MIMO system. Precoding, as a key technique, basically can be divided into two categories,
linear and non-linear. Linear precoding techniques have low computational complexity, but
the BER performance is not often satisfactory. Non-linear precoding techniques have excel-
lent BER performance at a cost of high computational complexity. In the following, some
traditional precoding techniques are briefly reviewed.
2.5.1 Linear Precoding
Zero-Forcing (ZF) and Minimum Mean Square Error (MMSE)
In this section, the implementation of precoding is detailed based on a multiuser MIMO
system. The precoding matrix P r is used to beamform the streams to a particular user r.
To obtain the precoding matrix P r, the total channel information H ∈ CMNr×Nt is assumed
known to the transmitter. For ZF and MMSE precoders the precoding matrix are generated
as
P zf = HH(HHH)−1 (2.31)
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and
Pmmse = HH(HHH + α2nI)
−1 (2.32)
where P zf ∈ CNt×MNr and Pmmse ∈ CNt×MNr . Linear precoding techniques such as Zero-
Forcing (ZF), Minimum Mean Square Error (MMSE) have the advantage of low complexity.
However, ZF or MMSE precoding can hardly approach the capacity which often leads to
unsatisfactory performance in physical-layer security.
Singular Value Decomposition (SVD)
Further research aim at the development of the capacity-achievable precoding techniques.
SVD precoding is a typical capacity-achievable precoding. If power allocation is employed at
the transmitter, the MIMO channel capacity can be achieved by implementing the Singular
Value Decomposition (SVD) technique. The SVD procedure shows that
H = UΣV H (2.33)
The total channel H is decomposed into a diagonal matrix Σ ∈ CMNr×Nt with two unitary
matrices U ∈ CMNr×MNr ,V ∈ CNt×Nt multiplied at the transmitter and receiver sides. The
diagonal entries of Σ are known as the singular values of H which are the absolute values of
the eigenvalues. Based on the obtained diagonal matrix Σ, a water-filling algorithm can be
employed to achieve the capacity of the MIMO channel.
Block Diagonalization (BD)
Block Diagonalization (BD) precoding technique is developed especially for multiuser MIMO
systems. It can be regarded as a two-step SVD precoding technique. Suppose we have a
single user MIMO system, the channel capacity can be realized by using the SVD technique
and water-filling algorithm. This is the second step SVD. Before this, the first step SVD aims
to suppress the interference between different users. In general, the precoding constraints in
the first step SVD is supposed to achieve
HrF j = 0 for r = 1, · · · , j − 1, j + 1, · · · , R, (2.34)
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where F j ∈ CNt×Nr is defined as a null space of H˜r ∈ C(M−1)Nr×Nt which is described as,
H˜r = [H
T
1 H
T
2 · · · HTr−1 HTr+1 · · · HTR]T (2.35)
From the SVD of H˜r
H˜r = U˜ rΣ˜r[V˜ r
(1)
V˜ r
(0)
]H (2.36)
V˜ r
(0) ∈ CNt×Nr is obtained as the precoding matrix F j . Through the first SVD step the
multi-user MIMO channel can be transformed into parallel effective single user MIMO chan-
nels Heff,r = HrF r = HrV˜ r
(0) ∈ CNr×Nr , then the second SVD of Heff,r is given by
Heff,r = U rΣrV r
H . (2.37)
where V r ∈ CNr×Nr . From equations (2.36) and (2.37) we can have the resulting precoding
matrix
PBDr = V˜ r
(0)
V r (2.38)
PBD = [V˜ 1
(0)
V 1 V˜ 2
(0)
V 2 · · · ˜V M (0)V M ] (2.39)
where PBDr ∈ CNt×Nr and PBD ∈ CNt×Nt . It is worth noting that we need to use β to control
the transmission power. And β can be obtained as:
β =
√
Er
Tr(PBDr srs
H
r P
BD
r
H
)
(2.40)
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2.5.2 Non-linear Precoding
Tomlinson-Harashima Precoding (THP)
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Figure 2.6: Different THP Precoding structures. (a) Decentralized THP Precoding (dTHP)
(b) Centralized THP Precoding (cTHP)
THP precoding is introduced in [31]. Figure 2.6 gives a brief structure of the THP precoding.
Based on the placement of the diagonal weighted matrix G, THP precoding can be divided
into two sub-structures. In the decentralized structure, the diagonal weighted matrix G is
at the receiver side and each receiver is allocated with a diagonal entry gk. This kind of
THP precoding is known as dTHP and it leads to larger system capacity and more flexible
subchannel management [32]. The other centralized structure THP precoding (cTHP) places
the diagonal weighted matrix G at the transmitter. In this work we will focus on dTHP
structure.
Conventional THP employs LQ decomposition. With implementing LQ decomposition of the
channel matrix in a MU-MIMO system, we can obtain
H = LQ, (2.41)
where L ∈ CMNr×Nt is a lower triangular matrix and Q ∈ CNt×Nt is a unitary matrix. Then
we can have the filters for the THP algorithm as:
F = QH , (2.42)
G = diag[l1,1 l2,2 · · · lMNr,MNr ], (2.43)
BdTHP = GL, (2.44)
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where li,i is the ith diagonal element of the matrix L. According to Figure 2.6, the received
signal for dTHP structure can be expressed as,
ydTHP = G(HFx+ n) (2.45)
where x ∈ CNt×1 is the combined transmit signal which can be calculated by
xi = si −
i−1∑
j=1
bi,jxj , i = 1, 2, · · · , Nt, (2.46)
following that, to control the power of the combined signal, modulo operation is applied
before transmitting. Here we use the symbol Γt(·) to represent the modulo-t operation.
Γt(xi) = xi − bRe(xi)
t
+
1
2
ct− jb Im(xi)
t
+
1
2
ct (2.47)
where b·c is the floor function and t is a constant for the periodic extension of the constellation.
ZF-THP algorithm is originally proposed by Tomlinson and Harashima. With the AWGN
channel CSI, the overall ZF-THP is a memoryless channel with input s and output y is given
by [33]
y = Γt(s+ a+ n) = Γt(s+ n). (2.48)
In equation (2.48), a represents the interference from other users. When ZF is applied, the
interference a is eliminated. Thus, the ZF-THP memoryless channel has mutual information
I(s;y) = H(y)−H(y|s)
= H(Γt(s+ n))−H(Γt(n))
≤ log2(t)−H(Γt(n)),
(2.49)
where H(·) represent the differential entropy and the upper bound of equation (2.49) can
be achieved if s is chosen to independent and identically distributed (i.d.d) uniform random
variables distributed over the interval (−t/2, t/2]. In [33], the value t is chosen to satisfy the
power constraint. Small values give a lower achievable information rate and large values will
cause the power constraint to be violated.
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Successive Optimization (SO) and SO-THP
Successive Optimization (SO) algorithm is employed in fading channels with the capability of
achieving capacity. In the approach described in [34] each transmit matrix is optimized such
that it does not interfere with any of the previous users. Each user will adjust its transmit
power to compensate for the interference received from users and subject to the constraint
that it does not interfere with any of those users. This approach applies the SO algorithm to
optimize the transmitter power to eliminate the ISI. Similar capacity-achieving schemes are
introduced in [35; 36; 37], but they assume at each successive step that the interfering signals
are known completely and use knowledge of these signals in coding the next signal.
In [34], the authors give a successive precoding algorithm in order to define a simplified
solution of the power control problem. By allowing a certain amount of interference, this
algorithm can also reduces the capacity loss due to the subspace cancellation. It also can be
applied to maintain a higher throughput for MU-MIMO transmission. First, for each user
is calculated the optimal capacity in a SISO system, which means the capacity one user can
achieve without any interference. Using SO, the modulation matrix for each user is designed
in such a way that it lies only in the null space of the channel matrices of previous users. As a
consequence, they will only generate the interference to this user. Let us define the previous
i− 1 users combined channel matrix as
H˜ i = [H
T
1 H
T
2 · · · HTi−1]T . (2.50)
As in the BD algorithm, the precoding matrix lies in the null space of H˜ i. Thereby, the i-th
user will not have any interference from any subsequent user (i+ 1, · · · ,M)
In [31], Successive Optimization Tomlinson-Harashima Precoding (SO-THP) is a combina-
tion of the Successive Optimization technique and Tomlinson-Harashima Precoding. In the
SO-THP algorithm we initially consider the channel capacity for each user without the in-
terference from other users as the optimal channel capacities for users in a multi-user MIMO
system.Then the SO technique is used to reorder the transmit signals and performs interfer-
ence cancellation. The replacement of the order of the transmit signals depends on which
THP precoding matrices minimize the difference between the optimal channel capacities with
that of the effective multi-user MIMO system channels. The main steps are introduced in
[31]. SO-THP algorithm has the advantage of improving the BER and the secrecy rate perfor-
mance, however, the complexity of this algorithm is high due to the successive optimization
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process and the multiple SVD operations.
Generalized Matrix Inversion and Simplified Generalized MMSE Channel Inver-
sion (S-GMI)
Generalized matrix inversion techniques have been introduced in [38]. Two approaches Gen-
eralized Zero-Forcing Channel Inversion (GZI) and Generalized MMSE Channel Inversion
(GMI) are illustrated. For GZI, we have the same goal as the BD algorithm, which is to
compute the null space of H˜r. Different from the BD algorithm, the first SVD is replaced
by the QR decomposition which is computationally simpler, as described by
Hˆr = [Qˆr
(0)
Qˆr
(1)
]Rˆr for r = 1, · · · ,M, (2.51)
where Qˆr
(0) ∈ CNt×Nr , Qˆr
(1) ∈ CNt×(M−1)Nr , Rˆr ∈ CNt×Nr and Hˆr ∈ CNt×Nr is the rth
element of the pseudo-inverse of the channel matrix Hˆ ∈ CNt×MNr is given by
Hˆ = HH(HHH)−1 = [Hˆ1 Hˆ2 · · · HˆM ]. (2.52)
From equation (2.52) we can have H˜rHˆr = 0. Following that, based on equation (2.51) we
can then obtain H˜rQˆr
(0)
= 0, which means the columns of Qˆr
(0)
are orthonormal bases for
the null space of H˜r. Following that the second step is the same as the SVD operation in
the BD algorithm:
HrQˆr
(0)
= U (2)r Σ
(2)
r V r
(2)H , (2.53)
where U
(2)
r ∈ CNr×Nr , Σ(2)r ∈ CNr×Nt , V (2)r ∈ CNt×Nt . The precoding matrix and the receive
filter are given by
PGZI = [Qˆ1
(0)
V 1
(2) Qˆ2
(0)
V 2
(2) · · · QˆM
(0)
V M
(2)], (2.54)
MGZI = diag{U (2)1
H
U
(2)
2
H · · · U (2)M
H}, (2.55)
where PGZI ∈ CNt×Nt ,MGZI ∈ CNt×Nt . Similar to the GZI approach, the GMI scheme also
uses the QR decomposition to decompose the MMSE channel inversion H¯ ∈ CNt×MNr as
expressed by
H¯ = (HHH + αI)−1HH , (2.56)
H¯r = [Q¯r
(0)
Q¯r
(1)
]R¯r for r = 1, · · · ,M, (2.57)
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where H¯r ∈ CNt×Nr , Q¯r(0) ∈ CNt×Nr , Q¯r(1) ∈ CNt×(M−1)Nr and R¯r ∈ CNt×Nr . Compared
to GZI, GMI takes the noise into account. It overcomes the noise enhancement in the BD
algorithm. Meanwhile in the second step SVD scheme, extra interference may be introduced.
To solve this problem, a transmit combining matrix T r is applied to Q¯r
(0)
. Under the total
transmit power constraint we use the minimum total MSE criterion to obtain the transmit
combining matrix T r. In [31] the transmit combining matrix T r is given by T r = βT¯ r as
described by
T¯ r =
Q¯r(0)H R∑
j=1
HHj HjQ¯r
(0)
+ αI
−1 Q¯r(0)HHHr HrQ¯r(0), (2.58)
where T r, T¯ r ∈ CNt×Nt . Once we have Q¯r and T r, the second SVD approach is
HrQ¯r
(0)
T r = U
(3)
r Σ
(3)
r V r
(3)H , (2.59)
Similarly to the GZI scheme, the precoding matrix as well as the receive filter for the GMI
scheme are
PGMI = [Q¯1
(0)
T 1V 1
(3) Q¯2
(0)
T 2V 2
(3) · · · Q¯M (0)TMV M (3)], (2.60)
MGMI = diag{U (3)1
H
U
(3)
2
H · · · U (3)R
H}, (2.61)
where PGMI ∈ CNt×Nt ,MGMI ∈ CNt×Nt . In [6], it has been proved that the transmit
combining matrix T r is not necessary since the regularized block diagonalization (RBD)
constraint is already satisfied. Therefore, a simplified GMI (S-GMI) is developed in [30] as
an improvement of the original RBD precoding in [39]. Based on the S-GMI algorithm, the
second SVD approach and the receive filter are obtained as:
HrQ¯r = U
(4)
r Σ
(4)
r V r
(4)H , (2.62)
P S−GMI = [Q¯1
(0)
V 1
(4) Q¯2
(0)
V 2
(4) · · · Q¯M (0)V M (4)], (2.63)
MS−GMI = diag{U (4)1
H
U
(4)
2
H · · · U (4)M
H}, (2.64)
where P S−GMI ∈ CNt×Nt , MS−GMI ∈ CNt×Nt .
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2.5.3 Lattice Reduction
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Figure 2.7: Voronoi Cell, Effective Radius and Covering Radius
An n-dimensional real lattice in an m-dimensional Euclidean space Rm can be described as
the set of integer linear combinations of n independent vectors:
LR = (BLRλ : λ ∈ Zn) (2.65)
where BLR = [b1 b2 · · · bn] is a basis of the lattice LR. In the wireless transmission
system, BLR can be regarded as the channel matrix and LR will be the channel matrix after
Lattice-Reduction (LR). Before the LR aided algorithms we will introduce some basic lattice
parameters mentioned in [40]. The shortest vector of the lattice LR is a non-zero vector in
LR with the smallest Euclidean norm. The length of the shortest vector is represented by
ε(BLR). The voronoi region of a lattice point αi is described by,
ΦLR = (y ∈ Rm : ‖y − αi‖ ≤ ‖y − αj‖,∀αi 6= αj) (2.66)
where ΦLR is the n-dimensional volume and it is determined by the determinant of R,
det(LR) =
√
det(BTLRBLR).
In Figure 2.7 two important lattice parameters related to the volume are given. The first
one is the effective radius of lattice volume ΦLR which is denoted by reff(LR). the effective
radius is the radius of an effective sphere Seff(LR). For large n, it is approximately
reff( LR) ≈
√
n/(2pie)det( LR)
1/n (2.67)
The covering radius of the lattice volume ΦLR , denoted by rcov(LR), is the radius of the
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smallest sphere centred at a lattice point which covers ΦLR . In wireless communications, the
signals are represented by a complex number. The real lattice definition can be extended to
complex values. The formula is similar,
 LC = BCuC : uC ∈ Z[i]n (2.68)
where BC is a basis of the complex lattice LC.
While as described in [41], a basis change cannot always lead to optimum performance, it
can in general improve performance. In particular, changing the lattice basis to be nearly
orthogonal and shorter, the sense of which we will make precise later, we can generally obtain
better decision boundaries. Based on the system described in Figure 2.1, the more correlated
the columns ofH, the more significant the improvements. We also need to note that changing
lattice basis does not change the lattice. The problem of finding the optimal lattice basis is
called the lattice reduction (LR) problem.
For the LR aided strategy, we employ the complex lattice reduction algorithm (CLR) [30] to
implement the size reduction before the reordering with the SO processing. Therefore, the
LR transformed channel for the rth user is obtained as
HHredr = H
H
r T r, (2.69)
where Hredr ∈ CNr×Nt is the transposed reduced channel matrix. The quantity T r ∈ CNr×Nr
is the transform matrix generated by the CLR algorithm [38]. Note that the transmit power
constraint is satisfied since T r is a unimodular matrix.
The basic idea behind using lattice reduction in conjunction with traditional low-complexity
detectors is to operate in a chosen lattice basis that is optimized for those detectors. In the
traditional system, the detector compensates for the original channel H to produce zˆ . In
the new system, we perform a basis change via a matrix T , which is illustrated by
y = Hs+ n = Hredz + n (2.70)
with the basis change, the traditional detector is first used to compensate for the new LR
transformed channel Hred to produce zˆ, then we can obtain the received signal sˆ.
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2.6 Relay Selection Techniques
In wireless networks, path loss or shadowing effect leads to the great attenuation of the
signal power during the broadcasting . Novel relay techniques are developed to accomplish
promising gain in throughput and energy efficiency in high attenuation scenarios [42; 43; 44].
In the presence of multiple relay nodes, transmission to the destination can be supported by
relays which experience desired channel fading and interference [45]. Recent research are also
developing the potential of applying relay system with security constraints [46; 47].
2.6.1 Relay Scheme
Depending on the processing of the received signal at the relay node, relay schemes can be
divided into two categories: amplify-and-forward (AF) and decode-and-forward(DF).
Amplify-and-Forward (AF)
In AF protocol relay network, the received signal at the relay node is processed by a multipli-
cation with an amplification coefficient. This amplification enlarges the power of the desired
signal which in some extent compensates the channel fading effect in the transmission. Mean-
while, the noise and interference remain in the amplification which determines the limited
application of the AF protocol in noise and interference channel. By transmitting the same
information through several nodes, AF relaying method is a critical cooperative diversity
scheme. The most attractive point of AF protocol relay network is the low complexity [48].
Decode-and-Forward (DF)
DF protocol employs decoding and encoding technique in the relay node. The transmission
performance relies on the decoding performance at the relay node. Efficient decoding pro-
cedures enable the elimination of the channel fading and interference occurred during the
transmission from transmitter to the relay [49]. By mitigating the channel fading and inter-
ference effects, the DF protocol is capable of achieving better performance than AF protocol
in a high noisy and interference channel. However the decoding and encoding process brings
much more complexity of implementation at relay nodes.
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Recent researches combine two protocols together. A hybrid technique is illustrated in [50]
which performs AF in a less noisy and interference environment and DF in a high noisy and
interference scenario.
2.6.2 Buffer-aided Relay Schemes
Selection of relays make it possible of realizing spatial application of multiple relays in a
wireless system. Buffers implemented at relay nodes provide an explore of the temporal
application with relays. The received signal can be stored in the buffers and wait for a
suitable forward time at which the signal will suffer low channel fading and interference. In
buffer-aided relay networks, the length of buffers can be assumed infinite to obtain an optimal
result which takes into account the full use of temporal benefit. Under assumption of finite
buffer length, it is suggested that sufficient buffer length can result in a close performance to
the optimal result [51; 52].
2.6.3 Relay Selection
In the presence of multiple relays, relay selection provides an efficient way of taking the ad-
vantage of spatial application in relay systems [14; 15]. Traditional relay selection techniques
are using a particular thresholds to maintain the relay selection. The threshold can be co-
efficients of the channel, SNRs and even BER values. Various threshold require different
knowledge of transmit information.
2.7 Jamming Techniques
Along with the development in the physical-layer security, the less theoretical jamming tech-
nique is considered to assist the secure transmission even in the scenario without knowledge of
eavesdroppers’ channel information. Artificial noise is generated at the transmit side. Broad-
casting at all directions expect to legitimate users, artificial noise is capable of improving the
physical-layer security performance by jamming the signal to eavesdroppers. With sufficient
power, the noise or interference can be introduced by an extra helper, which denotes a helper
or interference system.
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2.7.1 Artificial Noise
Recently, artificial noise is applied in a physical-layer security scheme to degrade the eaves-
droppers’ reception [3]. The intended user is unaffected, so that a non-zero secrecy rate is
ensured. A Gaussian artificial noise is generated with the assumption that the number of
eavesdropper antennas NT+k is strictly smaller than the number of transmitter antennas Ni.
To overcome the restriction NT+k < Ni, we can aim at maximizing the eavesdroppers’ error
probability PE rather than the secrecy rate [3]. Defining the notion of practical secrecy as
PE → 1 exponentially as the number of receiver antennas Ni → ∞, for any signal-to-noise
ratio (SNR) at the eavesdropper. More importantly, the definition of the covering ratio is
proposed as a fundamental secrecy parameter which guarantees the convergence of PE and
characterizes the amount of the artificial noise required.
First, to simplify the scenario, we can consider that both the receiver and the eavesdrop-
per have a single antenna each, and that multiple eavesdroppers cannot collude (i.e., Ni =
NT+k = 1). Wireless LAN is an example of such a scenario. With the base station as the
transmitter. The concept of artificial noise can be clearly illustrated in this scenario. The
artificial noise is produced such that it lies in the null space of the receiver’s channel, while
the information signal is transmitted in the range space of the receiver’s channel. This design
relies on knowledge of the receiver’s CSI, but not of the eavesdropper’s channel. The receivers
of the users are able to null out the artificial noise, and hence, the receiver is not affected by
the noise. However, in general, the eavesdropper’s channel will be degraded, since its range
space will be different from that of the receiver’s channel, and hence, some component of
artificial noise will lie in its range space. We now describe how the transmitter can generate
artificial noise to degrade the eavesdropper’s channel. The transmitter chooses xr ∈ CNr×1 as
the sum of information bearing signal sr ∈ CNr×1 and the artificial noise signal f r ∈ CNr×1
as given by
xr = sr + f r (2.71)
Both sr and f r are assumed complex Gaussian vectors. f r is chosen to lie in the null space
of Hr, such that Hrf r = 0. If Zr ∈ CNr×1 is an orthonormal basis for the null space of Hr,
with the assumptions that f r = Zrvr, and ZrZ
H
r = I, the signals received by the receiver
and the eavesdropper are given by, respectively,
y = Hrsr + nr (2.72)
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y = Hesr +Hef r + ne (2.73)
Note how the artificial noise f r is nulled out by the receivers channel but not necessarily by
the eavesdroppers channel. Thus, the eavesdropper channel is degraded with high probability,
while that of the receiver remains unaffected. If f r was chosen fixed, the artificial noise seen
by the eavesdropper would be small if Hef r is small. To avoid this possibility, the sequence
of f r is chosen to be complex Gaussian random vectors in the null space of Hr. In particular,
the transmitter chooses elements of vr to be i.i.d. complex Gaussian random variables with
variance σ2v , and independent in time as well. It follows that the elements of f r are also
Gaussian distributed. Based on channel matrix Hr, the transmitter chooses the information
bearing signal as xr = P rsr, where sr is the information signal. We assume that Gaussian
codes are used. P r is chosen such that HrP r 6= 0. Now, secrecy capacity is bounded below
by the difference in mutual information between the transmitter and the receiver versus the
transmitter and the eavesdropper.
For a passive eavesdropper, He is not known to the transmitter, so using the concavity
of log(·) and the i.i.d. assumption of Hr, the average secrecy capacity is maximized by
choosing P r = H
†
r/‖Hr‖. Thus, the information bearing signal xr lies in the range space of
H†r whereas the artificial noise lies in the null space of H
†
r.
2.7.2 Interference Systems
Besides the artificial noise, an interferer or helper is employed to assist the physical-layer
security transmission. This kind of systems using Gaussian interference channels are inves-
tigated in [53] with an exploration of the capacity for MIMO scenario. With the jamming
signal generated separately at the interference or helper node, secrecy rate of the transmis-
sion is improved [16; 54]. Then the scenario with multiple users are investigated in [55] with
MISO channel.
2.8 Summary
In this chapter we summarize some applications and some fundamental metrics of physical-
layer security research. The investigation of physical-layer security in our work locates in three
critical aspects: transmit processing strategies, allocation of relays and jamming techniques.
Following, based on the introduced techniques we will propose novel ideas to accomplish a
2.8. Summary 47
further development in physical-layer research.
Chapter 3
Successive Optimization
Tomlinson-Harashima Precoding
Strategies for Physical-Layer
Security in Wireless Networks
3.1 Introduction
In this chapter we explore novel non-linear precoding techniques with secrecy constraints
to ensure secure transmission in a multiuser MIMO downlink system. As an alternative
technique to linear precoding approches, non-linear precoding techniques are compatible of
mitigating interferences for small number multiuser systems [56]. This capacity-achievable
technique is of great potential for some future wireless networks, such as distributed networks
or wireless sensor networks.
3.1.1 Prior and Related Work
In recent years, precoding techniques, which rely on knowledge of channel state information
(CSI), have been widely studied in the downlink of multiuser MIMO (MU-MIMO) systems.
Linear precoding techniques such as zero-forcing (ZF), minimum mean-square error (MMSE)
and block diagonalization (BD) have been introduced and studied in[39; 5; 17]. Linear pre-
coding techniques accomplish multiuser interference mitigation in MU-MIMO systems with
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low complexity and acceptable throughput performance. Furthermore, non-linear precoding
techniques like Tomlinson-Harashima precoding (THP) [57], vector perturbation (VP) pre-
coding [58] are reported and investigated with their capability of ensuring higher throughput
than linear precoding techniques.
In the previous mentioned works, CSI knowledge is necessary for a precoding technique to
maintain a high throughput performance. In the context of a physical-layer security problem,
this assumption is strengthened to a more strict one with full CSI knowledge to eavesdroppers
[1; 2; 18]. To ensure a secure transmission with more reasonable assumptions, in [3] the
authors posed an artificial noise (AN) technique. Several criteria or strategies applying AN
to wireless systems have been introduced in [59; 60]. In particular, the approaches reported
in [61] have been applied to the downlink of MU-MIMO systems.
Apart from the studies in precoding techniques there are also some works that introduce
lattice-reduction (LR) strategies [40; 62]. The LR strategies are introduced prior to the
transmission aiming at achieving full diversity in the downlink MU-MIMO systems.
3.1.2 Motivation and Contributions
Prior work about physical-layer security systems based on [3; 61] indicate that linear pre-
coding techniques can effectively improve the secrecy rate of wireless systems. In terms of
throughput performance, non-linear precoding techniques can outperform linear approaches.
In particular, reduced complexity non-linear precoding techniques can maintain a higher level
of the sum-rate performance than linear schemes in high frequency transmission when the
set of active users is small [56; 63]. Meanwhile, non-linear precoding techniques have not
been investigated in physical-layer security systems with regards to their great potential of
improving the secrecy rate of a wireless network. In this chapter we investigate non-linear
precoding algorithms to assist the secrecy rate performance in a MU-MIMO system. With
less power consumption or reduced complexity, novel non-linear precoding algorithms are
desired to maintain full diversity in the MIMO systems.
In this chapter, we first present a study of conventional successive optimization Tomlinson-
Harashima precoding (SO-THP) algorithm. Following that developments of SO-THP algo-
rithm based on the generalized matrix inversion approach reported in [17] are given with
detailed algorithmic steps. More specifically, the novel algorithms exploit techniques includ-
ing block diagonalization, successive interference cancellation and lattice-reduction to balance
the performances between secrecy rate and complexity. The main idea of the proposed ap-
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proaches is to achieve a higher secrecy rate than existing non-linear and linear precoding
algorithms. In addition, full diversity of the MIMO system is sought by the proposed algo-
rithms. The major contributions in this chapter are summarized as follows:
• A novel non-linear precoding technique, namely, SO-THP+GMI is proposed for the
downlink of MU-MIMO networks in the presence of multiple eavesdroppers.
• The proposed SO-THP+GMI algorithm combines the SO-THP precoding with the GMI
technique to achieve a higher secrecy rate.
• The proposed SO-THP+GMI precoding algorithm is extended to a S-GMI version which
aims to reduce computational complexity of the SO-THP+GMI algorithm.
• An LR strategy is combined with the aforementioned S-GMI version proposed algorithm
and this so-called LR-aided version algorithm achieves full receive diversity.
• An analysis of the secrecy rate achieved by the proposed non-linear precoding algorithms
is carried out along with an assessment of their computational complexity.
• When different power levels are allocated to generate artificial noise, an analysis of the
power ratio which can achieve the optimal value in terms of secrecy rate is given.
3.2 System Model and Performance Metrics
In this section a downlink system model of a MU-MIMO network is considered. Following
that, performance metrics used in the assessment of the proposed and existing techniques are
described.
3.2.1 System Model
Here we consider a MU-MIMO downlink wireless network similar to the wiretap channel.
In Figure 3.1, the system contains one transmitter, M users and K eavesdroppers. Here we
assume that one eavesdropper tries to intercept the data for the specific user. The transmitter
is equipped with Nt antennas. Each user and each eavesdropper node are equipped with Nr
and Nk receive antennas, respectively. In this system we assume that the eavesdroppers do
not jam the transmission and the channel from the transmitter to each user or eavesdropper
follows a flat-fading channel model. The quantities Hr ∈ CNr×Nt and Hk ∈ CNk×Nt denote
the channel matrix of the rth user and kth eavesdropper, respectively. Following [31], the
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Figure 3.1: System model of a MU-MIMO system with M users and K eavesdroppers
number of antennas is assumed satisfying N totalt > M ×Nr. During the transmission, Nt =
M × Nr antennas at the transmitter are activated to perform the precoding procedure. In
other words, the precoding matrix is assumed here for convenience to be always a square
matrix.
We use the vector sr ∈ CNr×1 to represent the data symbols to be transmitted to user r. An
artificial noise (AN) can be injected before the data transmission to enhance the physical-
layer secrecy. We use the vector s′r ∈ Cm×1 with m 6 (N totalt −M × Nr) to denote the
independently generated jamming signal. Assume the transmit power of user r is Er, and
0 < ρ < 1 is the power fraction devoted to the user. Then, the power of user and jamming
signal can be respectively expressed as E[sHr sr] = ρEr and E[s
′H
r s
′
r] = (1 − ρ)Er. Finally,
the signal after precoding can be expressed as
xr = P rsr + P
′
rs
′
r, (3.1)
where the quantities P r ∈ CNt×Nr and P ′r ∈ CNt×m are the corresponding precoding
matrices. Here we take zero-forcing precoding as an instance. Given the total channel
matrix H = [HT1 H
T
2 · · · HTr · · · HTM ]T , the total precoding matrix can be ob-
tained as P ZF = HH(HHH)−1. The precoding matrix P ZF can be expanded to P ZF =
[P 1 P 2 · · · P r · · · PM ]. Simultaneously, the precoding matrix P ′r can be gener-
ated from the null space of the rth user channel Hr by singular value decomposition (SVD)
[61]. As a result, we have HrP
′
r = 0, which means the jamming signal does not interfere
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the user’s signal. The received data for each user or eavesdropper considering jamming and
multiuser interferences can be described by
yr = β
−1
r (HrP rsr +HrP
′
rs
′
r +Hr
T∑
j=1,j 6=r
P jsj + nr), (3.2)
where βr =
√
Er
||P r||+ ||P ′r||
is used to ensure that the transmit power after precoding
remains the same as the original transmit power Er for user r.
3.3 Review of the SO-THP Algorithm
In this section, a brief review of the conventional successive optimization THP (SO-THP) in
[39] is given. The general structure of the SO-THP algorithm is illustrated in Figure 3.2 and
its main implementation steps are introduced in the following.
M() F H D diag(DHFii)
−1 M()
B
n
transmitter channel receiver
modulo operator
modulo operators
x
xˆ
sˆ
y
yˆ
Figure 3.2: Centralized SO-THP structure
In Figure 3.2, a modulo operation M(·) which is defined in [64] is employed in the SO-THP
algorithm. The details of modulo operation are given in the literature review chapter. Based
on [31], THP can be equivalently implemented in a successive block diagonalization manner.
In particular, the precoding matrix is given by
PBDr = V˜ r
(0)
V eff , (3.3)
where V˜ r
(0) ∈ CNt×Nr is the nulling matrix of the rth user’s channel, V eff is a unitary matrix
of the corresponding effective channel and the demodulation matrix of the rth user is chosen
as Dr = U
H
eff , where U
H
eff is also obtained from the effective channel. Given a channel matrix
H˜r = [H˜1
T
H˜2
T · · · ˜Hr−1T ˜Hr+1T · · · H˜TT ]T , V˜ r
(0)
can be obtained by the SVD
operation H˜r = U˜ rΣ˜r[V˜
(1)
r V˜
(0)
r ]
H . Based on V˜ r
(0)
, an effective channel can be calculated
and with second SVD operation Heff = HrV˜ r
(0)
= U effΣeffV eff
H we can arrive at getting
V eff and U
H
eff .
For each iteration, the SO-THP algorithm selects the user with maximum capacity from the
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remaining users and process it first. The selection criterion is described as
min
r
(Cmax,r − Cr); (3.4)
where Cmax,r denotes the maximum capacity of the rth user and Cr is the capacity considering
the interference from the other users. Here we use the criterion to select a better channel for
user r to achieve a as high capacity as possible for the MU-MIMO channel. If we assume there
is no interference from other users and the capacity can be achieved by the SVD procedure,
we have
Hr = U rΣr[V r
(1)V r
(0)]H , (3.5)
Cmax,r = log2 det
(
I +HrV r
(1)V r
(1)HHr
H
)
. (3.6)
In the scenario considering the interference from the other users, the BD decomposition is
implemented on the channels of the remaining users in each iteration:
Cr = log2 det
(
I +HrP
BD
r P
BD
r
H
Hr
H
)
; (3.7)
Therefore, the filters for the SO-THP algorithm can be obtained as
F =
(
PBD1 · · ·PBDT
)
, (3.8)
D =

UHeff1
. . .
UHeffT
 , (3.9)
B = lower triangular
(
DHF • diag ([DHF ]−1ii )) . (3.10)
It is worth noting that F in (3.8), D in (3.9) are calculated in the reordered way according
to the criterion (3.4), and the scaling matrix G = diag
(
[DHF ]−1ii
)
.
3.4 Proposed Precoding Algorithms
In this section, we present three non-linear precoding algorithms SO-THP+GMI, SO-THP+S-
GMI and LR-SO-THP+S-GMI for the downlink of MU-MIMO systems, and a selection cri-
terion based on capacity is devised for these algorithms. We then derive filters for the three
proposed precoding techniques, which are computationally simpler than the conventional
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SO-THP.
According to [31], the conventional SO-THP algorithm aims at improving the sum rate per-
formance. Successive optimization using BD precoder provides a more practical way of
approaching capacity than traditional THP techniques. However, the complexity of this
approach is high due to the successive optimization procedure and the multiple SVD opera-
tions. In [38], an approach called generalized MMSE channel inversion (GMI) is developed
with QR decomposition to overcome the noise enhancement drawback of BD precoder caused
by its focus on the suppression of multi-user interference. In particular, GMI supplies a much
lower complexity than BD precoder. Later in [6],it is shown that the complete suppression of
multi-user interference is not necessary and residual interference is small and cannot affect the
sum-rate performance. This approach is called simplified GMI (S-GMI). Inspired by works
done in dirty paper coding (DPC) [65] and other non-linear precoding techniques [31; 32; 66],
we propose more practical non-linear precoding techniques to assist physical-layer security
transmission with a balance between complexity and BER performance.
SO-THP+GMI Algorithm
The proposed SO-THP+GMI algorithm focuses on achieving higher secrecy rate performance
than the conventional SO-THP algorithm with less computational complexity. Conventional
SO-THP algorithm employs BD precoding technique to obtain the precoding matrix (3.3)
as well as receive filter matrix. However, mitigating interference by BD precoding technique
leads to the noise enhancement in the procedure. In [38], a GMI scheme uses QR decompo-
sition to perform interference cancellation of the MMSE channel inversion H¯ ∈ CNt×MNr as
expressed by
H¯ = (HHH + αI)−1HH , (3.11)
H¯r = [Q¯r
(0)
Q¯r
(1)
]R¯r for r = 1, · · · ,M, (3.12)
where H¯r ∈ CNt×Nr , Q¯r(0) ∈ CNt×Nr , Q¯r(1) ∈ CNt×(M−1)Nr are orthogonal matrices, R¯r ∈
CNt×Nr is an upper triangular matrix. According to (3.11), the noise effect is taken into
account in GMI technique. As a result, the generation of the precoding matrix will mitigate
the noise enhancement. When the GMI generated precoding matrix is used to calculate the
channel capacity with (3.7), the reduced noise contributes to the increase of secrecy rate.
Also with (3.12), the QR decomposition reduces the computational complexity as compared
with the conventional SO-THP algorithm implementing SVD decomposition. In the GMI
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algorithm, to completely mitigate the interference and noise, a transmit combining matrix
T r given in [38] is applied to Q¯r
(0)
. Once we have Q¯r
(0)
and T r, we can write the relation
HrQ¯r
(0)
T r = U¯ rΣ¯rV¯ r
H
, (3.13)
Then the precoding matrix as well as the receive filter for the GMI scheme are given by
PGMI = [Q¯1
(0)
T 1V¯ 1 Q¯2
(0)
T 2V¯ 2 · · · Q¯M (0)TM ¯V M ], (3.14)
MGMI = diag{U¯1H U¯2H · · · U¯MH}, (3.15)
where PGMI ∈ CNt×Nt ,MGMI ∈ CNt×Nt . The details of the proposed SO-THP+GMI algo-
rithm to obtain the precoding and receive filter matrices are given in the table of Algorithm 1.
SO-THP+S-GMI Algorithm
Further development on SO-THP+GMI with complexity reduction leads to a novel SO-
THP+S-GMI alogrithm. A simplified GMI (S-GMI) algorithm has been posed in [6] as an
improvement of the original RBD precoding in [39]. In (3.13), to achieve complete interference
cancellation between different users,a transmit combining matrix is applied. However, this
procedure can be simplified according to the results shown in [6]. In the case that the
interference is not completely mitigated, the complexity will have a significant reduction with
just a slight decrease of sum-rate performance. Here, we incorporate the S-GMI technique
into an SO-THP scheme and devise the SO-THP+S-GMI algorithm. The transmit precoding
and receive filter matrices of the proposed SO-THP+S-GMI algorithm are described by
HrQ¯r
(0)
= U˜ rΣ˜rV˜ r
H
, (3.16)
P S−GMI = [Q¯1
(0)
V˜ 1 Q¯2
(0)
V˜ 2 · · · Q¯M (0) ˜V M ], (3.17)
MS−GMI = diag{U˜1H U˜2H · · · U˜MH}, (3.18)
where P S−GMI ∈ CNt×Nt , MS−GMI ∈ CNt×Nt .
With reduced computational complexity, the SO-THP+S-GMI algorithm is capable of achiev-
ing better secrecy rate performance especially at lower SNR. The detailed S-GMI procedure
implemented in the proposed SO-THP+S-GMI algorithm is shown in Algorithm 2. Cooper-
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Algorithm 1 Proposed SO-THP+GMI Precoding
1: for r = 1 : T do
2: Gr = Hr;
3: Gr = U rΣr[V r
(1)V r
(0)]H ;
4: F r = V r
(1);
5: Cmax,r = log2 det
(
I +N−1k,rGrF rF r
HGr
H
)
;
6: end for
7: M = H;
8: loop
9: while r = T : 1 do
10: for n = 1 : r do
11: G = (MHM + αI)−1MH
12: Gn = [Q¯r
(0)
Q¯r
(1)
]R¯n
13: MnQ¯r
(0)
T r = U˜nΣ˜nV˜ n
H
14: P n = Q¯n
(0)
T rV˜ n
(1)
15: end for
16: for j = 1 : r do
17: Cj = log2 det
(
I +N−1k,jM jP jP j
HM j
H
)
;
18: end for
19: ar = minj(Cmax,j − Cj);
20: F r = P ar ;
21: Dr = U˜ar
H
;
22: M = [H1
T · · ·Har−1THar+1T · · ·HMT ]T
23: end while
24: end loop
25: F = (F 1 · · ·FM ) ;
26: D =
D1 . . .
DM

27: B = lower triangular
(
DHF • diag ([DHF ]−1rr ))
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ated with Algorithm 1, the precoding and receive filter matrices can be obtained.
Algorithm 2 S-GMI Precoding
1: for n = 1 : r do
2: G = (MHM + αI)−1MH
3: Gn = [Q¯n
(0)
Q¯n
(1)
]R¯n
4: MnQ¯n
(0)
= U˜nΣ˜nV˜ n
H
5: P n = Q¯n
(0)
V˜ n
(1)
6: end for
LR-SO-THP+S-GMI Algorithm
The development in linear algebra contribute to the lattice reduction technique application
in wireless networks. According to study in [40], a basis change may lead to improved perfor-
mance as corroborated by lattice reduction techniques. More specifically, in wireless networks
the more correlated the columns of the wireless channel H, the more significant the improve-
ments will be if lattice reduction technique is applied. In [62], lattice reduction technique is
proved that it has the capability of achieving full diversity of a MIMO system. With complex
lattice reduction algorithm (CLR) employed in [30], the LR transformed channel for the rth
user is obtained as
HHredr = H
H
r Lr (3.19)
where Hredr ∈ CNr×Nt is the transposed reduced channel matrix. The quantity Lr ∈ CNr×Nr
is the transform matrix generated by the CLR algorithm. Note that the transmit power
constraint is satisfied since Lr is a unimodular matrix.
Compared to the conventional SO-THP algorithm, the lattice reduced channel matrix Hredn
is employed in the conventional S-GMI algorithm. The details of the LR aided S-GMI Proce-
dure are given in Algorithm 3. Cooperated with Algorithm 1, we can complete the calculation
of precoding and receive filter matrices.
Algorithm 3 Lattice-Reduction aided S-GMI Procedure
1: for n = 1 : r do
2: G = (HHH + αI)−1HH
3: [Hredn
H Q¯
(0)
n ] = CLLL(G
H
n )
4: Mn = Hblackn
5: MnQ¯n
(0)
= U˜nΣ˜nV˜ n
H
6: P n = Q¯n
(0)
V˜ n
(1)
7: end for
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3.5 Analysis of the Algorithms
In this section, we conduct an analysis of the secrecy rate of the proposed precoding algorithms
with a comparison in terms of computational complexity.
Computational Complexity Analysis
Table 3.1: Computational complexity of the proposed SO-THP+GMI algorithm
Steps Operations Flops Case
(2, 2, 2)× 6
1 Gr = U rΣr[V r
(1)V r
(0)]H ; 32R(NtN
2
r
+N3r ) 3072
2 G¯ = (2N3t − 2N2t
G = (HHH + αI)−1HH +Nt + 16NRN2t ) 3822
3 G¯n = Q¯nR¯n
R∑
r=1
16r(N2t Nr
+NtN
2
r +
1
3N
3
r ) 9472
4 Heff,n = HnQ¯nT n
R∑
r=1
16rNRN
2
t 20736
5 Heff,n = U
(4)
n Σ
(4)
n V n
(4)H
R∑
r=1
64r(98N
3
r+
NtN
2
r +
1
2N
2
t Nr) 26496
6 B = lower triangular(
DHF • diag ([DHF ]−1rr )) 16NRN2t 3456
total 67054
According to [30], it can be calculated that the cost of the QR in FLOPs is 22.4% lower than
BD. The results shown in Table 3.1 indicate that the complexity is reduced about 22.4% by
the proposed SO-THP+GMI compared with the conventional SO-THP calculated in the same
way. Among all investigated algorithms, SO-THP+S-GMI achieves a complexity reduction
about 34.4% less than that of the conventional SO-THP algorithm and becomes the lowest
computational complexity non-linear precoding technique.
Figure 3.3 shows the required FLOPS of the proposed and existing precoding algorithms.
Linear precoding gives lower computational complexity but the BER performance is worse
than non-linear ones. The three proposed algorithms show an advantage over the conven-
tional SO-THP algorithm in terms of complexity. Among all the three proposed algorithms,
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Figure 3.3: Computational complexity in FLOPs for MU-MIMO systems
SO-THP+S-GMI has the lowest complexity followed by LR-SO-THP+S-GMI algorithm. SO-
THP+GMI requires the highest complexity. In Figure 3.3, SO-THP+S-GMI algorithm has
similar performance as LR-SO-THP+S-GMI algorithm. Although the lattice reduction pro-
cedure is implemented in the LR-SO-THP+S-GMI, the matrices produced in the lattice
reduction can be also used in the S-GMI algorithm. The complexity of the LR-SO-THP+S-
GMI algorithm is slightly higher than SO-THP+S-GMI.
Secrecy rate Analysis
Proposition 1. In full-rank MU-MIMO systems with perfect knowledge of CSI, the proposed
algorithms are capable of achieving a high secrecy rate and in the high-SNR regime (i.e.,
P →∞) the secrecy rate will converge to CP→∞sec which is given as (3.20),
CP→∞sec = log
(
det
(
(HeaH
H
ea)
−1(HbaHHba)
))
(3.20)
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Cs = max
Rs0,Tr(Rs)=P
log
(
det
(
(I +HeaRsH
H
ea)
−1(I +HbaRsHHba)
))
(3.24)
Cs = max
Rs0,Tr(Rs)=P
log
(
det
(
Γba(P )Φ1(P ,Rs)
−1Φ2(P ,Rs)
))
(3.25)
Φ1(P ,Rs) = (HeaPP
HHHea)
−1(I +HeaRsHHea) (3.26)
Φ2(P ,Rs) = (HbaPP
HHHba)
−1(I +HbaRsHHba) (3.27)
Under the conditions
HHbaHba HHeaHea (3.21)
rank(Hba) = rank(Hea) (3.22)
and based on (2.29) we can have the secrecy capacity expressed as (3.24). If we assume
Γ(P ) = (HeaPP
HHHea)
−1(HbaPPHHHba) (3.23)
the equation (3.24) can be converted to (3.25) with (3.23) .
In (3.25), (3.26) and (3.27), P is the precoding matrix derived from the legitimate users’
channel. With Rs = E[xsx
H
s ] = E[Pss
HPH ], E[ssH ] = RP and PP
H = I, we can have,
E[(PPH)−1Rs] = RP (3.28)
Then
E[(HbaPP
HHHba)
−1HbaRsHHba] = RP (3.29)
E[(HeaPP
HHHea)
−1HeaRsHHea] = RP (3.30)
In (3.25), the expectation value is given as (3.31). Substituting (3.29) into (3.31) the formula
can be expressed as (3.33).
According to (3.33), in the high-SNR regime and when SNR→∞, P →∞, SA→ I. Then,
the secrecy rate expressed in (3.25) will result in (3.34). To satisfy the power constrain, we
always have E[PPH ] = I, then the secrecy rate Csec will converge to a constant, that is,
CP→∞sec = log
(
det(HeaH
H
ea)
−1(HbaHHba)
)
(3.35)
This completes the derivation.
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SA = E
[
Φ1(P ,Rs)
−1Φ2(P ,Rs)
]
= E
[
Φ3(P ,Rs)
−1
(
(HbaPP
HHHba)
−1 + (HbaPPHHHba)
−1HbaRsHHba)
)] (3.31)
Φ3(P ,Rs) = (HeaPP
HHHea)
−1 + (HeaPPHHHea)
−1HeaRsHHea (3.32)
SA = E
[(
(HeaPP
HHHea)
−1 +RP
)−1(
(HbaPP
HHHba)
−1 +RP
)]
= E
[
I +
(
(HeaPP
HHHea)
−1 +RP
)−1(
(HbaPP
HHHba)
−1 − (HeaPPHHHea)−1
)]
(3.33)
CP→∞sec = log
(
det
(
(HeaPP
HHHea)
−1(HbaPPHHHba)
))
(3.34)
In the following, the percentage of the injected artificial noise power is set to 40% of the total
transmit power. The percentage of the artificial noise power as compared to signal transmit
power is determined to achieve an optimal result in terms of secrecy rate. The details of
the derivation are expressed in the Appendix A. When AN is added during the transmission,
equation (2.29) can be transformed to:
log
(
det(I +HbaRsH
H
ba)
)
− log
(
det
(
I + (I +HeaR
′
sH
H
ea)
−1(HeaRsHHea)
)) (3.36)
To assess the influence of different channel gain ratios between legitimate users and the
eavesdroppers, we fix the legitimate users’ channel gain and change the eavesdroppers’. The
above equation (3.36) can be further transformed to
log(det(I +HbaRsH
H
ba))
− log(det(I + ((HeaHHea)−1 +R′s)−1Rs)
(3.37)
In the high-SNR regime, P → ∞, according to (3.28), Tr(Rs),Tr(R′s) → ∞, the term
(HeaH
H
ea)
−1 then can be omitted and the result is the following expression
log(det(I +HbaRsH
H
ba))− log(det(I + (R′s)−1Rs), (3.38)
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Considering artificial noise, (R′s)−1Rs = ρ/(1 − ρ)I. When ρ is fixed, then log(det(I +
(R′s)−1Rs)) would be a constant. From (3.38), the secrecy rate will increase even when
the eavesdroppers have better statistical channel knowledge than the legitimate users. The
secrecy rate can be positive in the scenario that the eavesdroppers have better statistical
channel knowledge. With more power allocated to the artificial noise 1 − ρ → 1, less power
will be available for the users ρ→ 0, which will lead to a fast decrease of the capacity to the
intended users which is expressed as log(det(I +HbaQsH
H
ba)). As a result, the secrecy rate
will finally fall to zero. By changing the variable ρ from 0.1 to 0.9, the secrecy rate will rise,
achieve its maximum value and then gradually decline.
3.6 Simulation Results
A system withN totalt = 4 transmit antennas and T = 2 users as well asK = 1, 2 eavesdroppers
is considered. Each user or eavesdropper is equipped with Nr = 2 and Nk = 2 receive
antennas. m = σ
2
ea
σ2ba
represents the gain ratio between the main and the wire-tap channel. In
the simulations, the channels are generated according to fast fading channel model.
Perfect Channel State Information
In Figure 3.4 the proposed LR-SO-THP+S-GMI algorithm has the best uncoded BER per-
formance. From the figure, we can see that when the lattice reduction technique is employed,
the BER performance of the MU-MIMO system will improve. Here are the BER perfor-
mances of the intended users and we use them to show the differences in BER when different
precoding algorithms are applied. Although this is not directly relevant to PLS, the results
indicate the algorithms which can be used to achieve a more reliable transmission. In Figure
3.7, in the scenario where T > K the secrecy rate of the proposed algorithms have around
5 bits/Hz higher rate than the other precoding techniques. When T = K, Figure 3.5 shows
that the proposed algorithms achieve a higher secrecy rate than the other techniques at low
SNRs. Moreover, the secrecy rate will converge to a constant which will depend on the gain
ratio between the main and the wire-tap channels m.
Imperfect Channel State Information
In the simulations, the channel errors are modeled as a complex random Gaussian noise
matrix E following the distribution CN (0, σ2e). Then, the imperfect channel matrix He is
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Figure 3.4: BER performance with precoding techniques in 4× 4× 2 MU-MIMO broadcast
channel, m = 0.5
defined as
He = H +E (3.39)
We assume the channels of the legitimate users are perfect and the transmitter has inaccurate
CSI to the eavesdroppers.
In Figure 3.6, the secrecy rate performance is evaluated in the imperfect CSI scenario. Com-
pared with the secrecy rate performance in Figure 3.5, the secrecy rate will suffer a huge
decrease in the imperfect CSI scenario. When T = K, Figure 3.5 shows that the secrecy
rate at low SNR is degraded and the secrecy rate requires very high SNR to converge to a
constant. It is worth noting that the proposed SO-THP+S-GMI has the best secrecy rate
performance amongst the studied precoding techniques.
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Figure 3.5: Secrecy rate performance with precoding techniques in 4 × 4 × 4 MU-MIMO
broadcast channel
Imperfect Channel State Information With Artificial Noise
In Figure 3.7 AN is added and the total transmit power Es is the same as before. Comparing
the results in Figure 3.5 and Figure 3.7, it is clear that by injecting artificial noise, the secrecy
rate achieved can be much higher than that without artificial noise in the high SNR scenario.
In Figure 3.7, we consider the secrecy rate performance with the channel gain ratio m = 2.
According to the secrecy performance of Figure 3.8, 40% of the transmit power Es is used
to generate AN. In Figure 3.8, the secrecy rate is plotted against the ratio of the transmit
signal power to the artificial noise, where the channel gain ratio is m = 1. Comparing the
theoretical and the simulation results, the optimal values match (ρ = 0.6). .
3.7 Summary
Precoding techniques are widely used in the downlink of MU-MIMO wireless networks to
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Figure 3.6: Secrecy rate with precoding techniques 4 × 4 × 4 MU-MIMO broadcast channel
with imperfect CSI
achieve good BER performance. The three proposed algorithms can all achieve higher secrecy
rate performance than conventional techniques. Firstly if we consider the complexity as the
most important metric, among all the studied non-linear precoding techniques, the proposed
SO-THP+S-GMI algorithm requires the lowest computational complexity which results in
a significant improvement on the efficiency. The BER and the secrecy rate performances
of the SO-THP+S-GMI algorithm are also superior to the existing linear and non-linear
algorithms considered. Secondly, if transmission reliability comes first in the design, the LR-
SO-THP+S-GMI algorithm is also superior to the existing linear and non-linear algorithms
considered.
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Chapter 4
Effective Relay Selection
Algorithms for Physical-Layer
Security in Multiple-Antenna Relay
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4.1 Introduction
Relay selection scheme as an important role in relay systems is investigated in various sce-
narios such as multiuser relay networks [67], cooperative relay systems [11] and cognitive
relay networks [68]. In [69], relay selection methods are considered with the impact of co-
channel interference. The performance in terms of secrecy rate can be significantly affected
by the relay selection criterion adopted [70]. Existing relay selection algorithms depend on
the knowledge of the channels between the source to the relays and the relays to the users
[47]. Taking the channels from the source to the eavesdroppers into account, a relay selec-
68
4.2. System Model 69
tion approach denoted max-ratio criterion has been proposed in [12] based on knowledge
of the channels to both legitimate users and eavesdroppers. In prior work, the assumption
of knowledge of the channels to the eavesdroppers has been adopted even though it is im-
practical. Studies have considered the max-ratio relay selection policy, which employs the
signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio (SINR) as the relay selection criterion and requires the
knowledge of the interference between users and the channels to the eavesdroppers.
In this chapter, we examine the secrecy rate performance of multiple-relay selection algorithms
based on the SINR and the SR criteria, which require the knowledge of the interference and the
channels to the eavesdroppers in single-antenna as well as multiuser MIMO relay networks.
Novel effective relay selection algorithms based on the SINR and SR criteria that do not
require knowledge of the channels of the eavesdroppers and interference are developed by
exploiting linear algebra properties and a simplification of the expressions. The secrecy rate
performance of the proposed algorithms is shown to approach that of techniques with full
knowledge of the interference and the channels to the eavesdroppers.
4.2 System Model
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Figure 4.1: Multiuser MIMO network with eavesdroppers.
A description of the downlink multiuser MIMO relay network considered in this chapter is
shown in Fig. 4.1, where the system employs two time slots to transmit the data from the
source node to the users. Each relay and each user are equipped with Ni and Nr antennas, re-
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spectively. We consider a source node, which transmits s = [sT1 s
T
2 · · · sTM ]T ∈ CMNr×1
to relays. To broadcast the signal to M users, the total number of transmit antennas should
be limited according to N totalt > MNr. For convenience, we assume that the number of the
active antennas used for transmitting user signals is Nt and Nt = MNr. At the same time,
in order to receive the signals with a set of T relays, T × Ni = Nt antennas at relays are
employed. In the second time slot, the relays will forward the signals to M users. During
the transmission from the source to the users, there are N eavesdroppers, which attempt to
decode the signals. Each eavesdropper is equipped with Ne antennas.
In this system, we assume that the eavesdroppers do not jam the transmission and the data
transmitted to each user, relay, jammer and eavesdropper experience a flat-fading MIMO
channel. The source node has full knowledge of the channels from the source to the relays as
well as from the relays to the users. The quantities Hφi ∈ CNi×Nt and Hek ∈ CNe×Nt denote
the channel matrices of the ith relay and the kth eavesdropper, respectively. If we assume
Ψ contains sets of T -combinations of the total relay set Ω then the task of relay selection is
to choose the set of relays that satisfies a chosen criterion. Given the set of selected relays
expressed as ϕ = [φ1 φ2 · · · φT ] ∈ Ψ, the channel from the transmitter to the relays
and the eavesdroppers can be obtained as H i = [H
T
φ1
HTφ2 · · · HTφT ]T ∈ CTNi×Nt and
He = [H
T
e1 H
T
e2 · · · HTeK ]T ∈ CKNe×Nt . The matrix Hφir ∈ CNr×Ni represents the
channel between the ith relay and the rth user. The channels from the selected relays to the
rth user can be described by
Hr = [Hφ1r Hφ2r · · · HφT r], (4.1)
where Hr ∈ CNr×TNi and φi represents the ith selected relay with a chosen relay selection
criterion. In the following section we will further discuss various relay selection criteria, where
T is the total number of selected relays.
In Phase I, the signal is transmitted from the source to the relays. If a precoder matrix
U = [U1 U2 · · · UM ] ∈ CNt×MNr is applied, when the relay is selected, the received
signal in all relays can be expressed as
yi = H iUs+ ni, (4.2)
where ni = [nφ1 nφ2 · · · nφT ] ∈ CTNi×1 is the noise vector that is assumed to be
Gaussian. If the interference for relay i is described by Hφi
∑T
j 6=i,j=1U jsj , then the received
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signal is given by
yφi = HφiU isi +Hφi
T∑
j 6=i,j=1
U jsj + nφi . (4.3)
In Phase II, the signal is transmitted from the relays to the users. The signal at the relay
nodes is given by yi = [y
T
φ1
yTφ2 · · · yTφT ]T ∈ CTNi×1. When we use the amplify-and-
forward technique, the received signal at user r is described by
yr = Hryi + nr. (4.4)
In the presence of multiple relay nodes, relay selection is performed before transmission to
the relays. In a half-duplex system, we use η1 = maxϕ1{·} to represent a metric obtained
with the channel information from the source to the relays and η2 = maxϕ2{·} as another
metric calculated with information from the relays to the users. ϕ1 and ϕ2 denote the set
of relays used for transmitting or receiving signals, respectively. Then if η1 ≥ η2 we receive
using the set of relays ϕ1; otherwise we transmit using ϕ2.
A multiple-relay selection algorithm for this scenario is shown in Algorithm 4. More specif-
ically, step 33 takes the channel gain as the selection criterion and it can be replaced with
different selection criteria. Depending on the choice of relay selection a designer must alter
steps 7, 22 and 33.
4.3 Relay Selection Criteria
In this section, we examine relay selection criteria for the system under consideration.
4.3.1 Max-ratio criterion
Conventional relay selection is based on the full channel information between the source to the
relays and the relays to the users. A max-link relay selection is developed based on the max-
min relay selection for decode-and-forward (DF) relay systems [71]. With the consideration
of the eavesdropper, a max-ratio selection [12] in a single-antenna scenario is given by
φmax−ratio = maxφi∈ϕ
(
ηmax−ratio1 , η
max−ratio
2
)
, (4.5)
where
ηmax−ratio1 =
maxφi∈ϕ:Q(φi)6=L ‖hS,φi‖2
‖hse‖2 (4.6)
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Algorithm 4 Relay selection algorithm
1: Ω0 = Ω
2: φtotal = length(Ω)
3: Q = zeros(1 : φtotal)
4: for k = 1 : T do
5: for i = 1 : φtotal do
6: if Q(i) = 0 then
7: θφi = trace(HφiH
H
φi
)
8: Q(i) = Q(i) + 1
9: else
10: θφi = 0
11: end if
12: end for
13: ϕselectk = maxφi∈Ω0{θφi}
14: ηk = θϕselectk
15: Ω0 = [1 2 · · · φi − 1 φi + 1 · · ·φtotal]
16: end for
17: η1 =
∑T
k=1 ηk
18: Ω1 = Ω
19: for r = 1 : M do
20: for i = 1 : φtotal do
21: if Q(i) 6= 0 then
22: θφi = trace(HφirHφir
H)
23: Q(i) = Q(i)− 1
24: else
25: θφi = 0
26: end if
27: end for
28: ϕselectr = maxφi∈Ω1{θφi}
29: ηr = θϕselectr
30: Ω1 = [1 2 · · · φi − 1 φi + 1 · · ·φtotal]
31: end for
32: η2 =
∑M
r=1 ηr
33: ϕselect = maxϕ (η1, η2)
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and
ηmax−ratio2 = max
φi∈ϕ:Q(φi)6=0
‖hφi,D‖2
‖hφie‖2
. (4.7)
Furthermore, in the scenario with only statistical distribution of the CSI to the eavesdroppers,
the channel parameters in (4.6) and (4.7) are replaced by statistical values.
4.3.2 SINR criterion
Based on the max-ratio criterion, when we consider a multiuser MIMO system, the inter-
ference from other users is taken into account in the relay selection criterion. According to
(4.3), the SINR criterion can be expressed similarly as
ϕSINR = maxϕ (ηSINR1 , ηSINR2) , (4.8)
where ηSINR1 is the average value of SINR over relay set ϕ. The SINR of the selected relay
node φi can be obtained by
ηSINRϕφi
= max
i
SINRi
= max
i
1
Ni
Ni∑
n=1
SINRn
= max
i
1
Ni
Ni∑
n=1
hHφinRdhφin
hHφinRInhφin
.
(4.9)
in (4.9), hφin ∈ CNt×1 represents the nth stream for the ith relay. Rd = U isisHi UHi ∈ CNt×Nt
is the correlation matrix of the received signal for node i and RIn =
∑m
j 6=i,j=1U jsjs
H
j U
H
j +
njn
H
j ∈ CNt×Nt represents the sum of the correlation matrix of the interference and correla-
tion matrix of the noise. Similarly, ηSINR2 is the average value of SINR with relay set ϕ to
users. The SINR of user r can then be calculated by
ηSINRϕ,r = maxr
1
Nr
Nr∑
n=1
hHφinrRrhφinr
hHφinrRInhφinr
, (4.10)
where Rr = yiy
H
i ∈ CTNi×TNi and hφinr ∈ CTNi×1 is the nth stream for user r.
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4.3.3 Secrecy rate criterion
In a multi-user MIMO system, the secrecy-rate criterion considering interferences [72] is given
by
ϕ = maxφi∈ϕ,ϕ∈Ψ {log[det(I + Γr,i)]− log[det(I + Γe,i)]} , (4.11)
where Γr,i is given as
Γr,i = (H iRInH
H
i )
−1(H iRdHHi ), (4.12)
and
Γe,i = (HeRInH
H
e )
−1(HeRrHHe ), (4.13)
In (4.11), the criterion is based on the SR related to destination i and the destination can be
relays as well as users.
4.4 Proposed relay selection algorithms
In prior work, the channels of the source to eavesdroppers as well as the interference are
assumed to be available at the transmitter. However, this assumption is impractical in wireless
transmissions [73]. To obviate this need, we propose effective relay selection algorithms with
partial channel information.
4.4.1 Simplified SINR-Based Relay Selection (S-SINR)
In the following, we choose the SINR criterion and develop a simplified SINR-based (S-SINR)
relay selection algorithm with consideration of only the channels of the users, which can be
readily obtained via feedback channels. If at the transmitter, a linear precoder U is applied,
the received signal can be expressed as
hHφinRdhφin = h
H
φin
U isis
H
i U
H
i hφin . (4.14)
With linear zero-forcing precoding, we have hHφinU i = [1 0 · · · 0] and (4.14) can be
written as
hHφinRdhφin = σ
2
d, (4.15)
where Rd holds for independent and identically distributed entries of s with σ
2
d being the
variance of the transmit signal. Based on (4.9) and (4.15), the proposed S-SINR algorithm
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solves
ηSINRϕφi
= max
i
1
Ni
Ni∑
n=1
σ2d
hHφinRInhφin
. (4.16)
According to (4.16), the maximization performed over Ni data steams is costly and requires
the CSI to the relays and the correlation matrix of the interference. Moreover, the SINR for
each receive antenna is calculated with the obtained information. In order to simplify the
maximization we assume that the streams for a device or relay have similar SINR. With this
assumption we can have
ηSINRϕφi
= min
i
hHφinRInhφin , (4.17)
We assume RIn = DIn +G, DIn is a diagonal matrix with the diagonal elements of RIn and
G containing the other elements of RIn. With DIn and G, we have
hHφinRInhφin = h
H
φin
DInhφin + h
H
φin
Ghφin
= σ2In‖hφin‖2 + ‖hHφinGhφin‖,
(4.18)
If we have two data streams and SINR1 > SINR2, based on (4.16), we get
hHφi1RInhφi1 < h
H
φi2
RInhφi2 , (4.19)
with (4.18), (4.19) can be expressed as
σ2In‖hφi1‖2 + ‖hHφi1Ghφi1‖ < σ2In‖hφi2‖2 + ‖hHφi2Ghφi2‖, (4.20)
rewrite (4.20), we can obtain
‖hφi1‖2 < ‖hφi2‖2 +
1
σ2In
(‖hHφi2Ghφi2‖ − ‖hHφi1Ghφi1‖), (4.21)
If G is small compared with σ2InI, we omit the term (‖hHφi2Ghφi2‖ − ‖hHφi1Ghφi1‖). Finally
if SINR1 > SINR2, we have
‖hφi1‖2 < ‖hφi2‖2, (4.22)
As a result, the SINR criterion can be simplified to the selection of the channel information
as described by
ˆηSINRϕφi
= min
i,n
‖hφin‖2. (4.23)
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With the criterion expressed in (4.23), the interference can be omitted and only the channel
information is necessary. Comparing (4.23) and (4.16), the optimization is performed by
calculating channel gains for each antenna which is obviously easier than calculating SINRs
for every antenna. Similarly, (4.10) can be obtained as
ˆηSINRϕ,r = minr,n
‖hφinr‖2. (4.24)
Based on (4.23) and (4.24), the SINR criterion in (4.8) can be simplified and the proposed
S-SINR algorithm is given by
ϕS−SINR = maxϕ ( ˆηSINR1 , ˆηSINR2) , (4.25)
which only needs the channel information. In (4.25), the calculation of ˆηSINR1 and ˆηSINR2 is
in the same way as in (4.8). With the S-SINR criterion, the step 7, step 22 and step 33 in
Algorithm 4 can be replaced by the step 5, step 20 and step 31 in Algorithm 5, respectively.
4.4.2 Simplified SR-Based (S-SR) Multiple-Relay Selection
In the proposed S-SR algorithm with partial channel information, the covariance matrix of
the interference and the signal can be described asRI = H i
−1H iH
−1
+
∑
j 6=iU js
(t)
j s
(t)
j
H
U j
H
and Rd = U is
(t)
i s
(t)
i
H
U i
H , respectively. If channel matrices are assumed perfectly known
prior to transmission, we can further obtain an alternative way of expressing the SR criterion.
The proposed SR-based relay selection algorithm is given by
ϕS−SR = max
φi∈ϕ,ϕ∈Ψ
{
log
(
det [I + Γr,i]
)
− log ( det [I +UHi R−1I U iRd])}, (4.26)
which can be achieved without knowledge of the channels of the eavesdroppers. In what
follows, we detail the derivation of the S-SR relay selection algorithm.
From the original expression for the SR criterion, which is shown in (4.11), we propose the
following approach:
ϕ = maxφi∈ϕ,ϕ∈Ψ
{
det(I + Γr,i)
det(I + Γe,i)
}
, (4.27)
In (4.27), our aim is to eliminate the channel information of eavesdroppers from the denom-
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Algorithm 5 Relay selection algorithm with S-SINR criterion
1: Ω0 = Ω
2: for k = 1 : T do
3: for i = 1 : φtotal do
4: if Q(i) = 0 then
5: θφi =
∑n
1 ‖hφin‖2
6: Q(i) = Q(i) + 1
7: else
8: θφi = 0
9: end if
10: end for
11: ϕselectk = minφi∈Ω0{θφi}
12: ηk = θϕselectk
13: Ω0 = [1 2 · · · φi − 1 φi + 1 · · ·φtotal]
14: end for
15: ˆηSINR1 =
1
T
∑T
k=1 ηk
16: Ω1 = Ω
17: for r = 1 : M do
18: for i = 1 : φtotal do
19: if Q(i) 6= 0 then
20: θφi =
∑n
1 ‖hφinr‖2
21: Q(i) = Q(i)− 1
22: else
23: θφi = 0
24: end if
25: end for
26: ϕselectr = minφi∈Ω1{θφi}
27: ηr = θϕselectr
28: Ω1 = [1 2 · · · φi − 1 φi + 1 · · ·φtotal]
29: end for
30: ˆηSINR2 =
∑M
r=1 ηr
31: ϕselect = maxϕ ( ˆηSINR1 , ˆηSINR2)
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inator. The denominator can be expressed as
det[Λ1
−1Λ1 + Λ1−1(HeRdHHe )], (4.28)
where Λ1 = HeRIH
H
e . Since Λ1 is square and with square matrices we have det(AB) =
det(A) det(B), (4.28) results in
det[Λ1
−1]det[Λ1 + (HeRdHHe )], (4.29)
Using the property det(A−1) = 1det(A) [74], we have
det[Λ1]
−1det[Λ1 + (HeRdHHe )], (4.30)
In (4.30), we separate the equation into two parts:
det[Λ1]
−1 = det[HeRIHHe ]
−1
= det[He(
∑
j 6=i
U js
(t)
j s
(t)
j
H
U j
H)HHe ]
−1. (4.31)
On the left-hand side of (4.31), we multiply U iU i
−1 = I and on the right side we multiply
UHi
−1
U i
H = I, yielding
det[Λ1]
−1 = {det[HeU i]
det[(
∑
j 6=i
U i
−1U js
(t)
j s
(t)
j
H
U j
HUHi
−1
)]
det[UHi H
H
e ]}−1,
(4.32)
Similarly, the second part in equation (4.30) can be obtained as
det[Λ1 + (HeRdH
H
e )] = det[HeU i]
det[(
∑
j 6=i
U i
−1U js
(t)
j s
(t)
j
H
U j
HUHi
−1
) + s
(t)
i s
(t)
i
H
]
det[UHi H
H
e ],
(4.33)
As the matrices HeU i and U
H
i H
H
e are square and have equal size, based on (4.30), (4.32)
and (4.33) we can eliminate the term det[HeU i] and det[U
H
i H
H
e ]. The secrecy rate selection
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criterion (4.27) can then be rewritten as
ϕ = maxφi∈ϕ,ϕ∈Ψ
{
det[I + Γr,i]
det[Λ2]
}
, (4.34)
where Λ2 require only the information of precoding matrices and transmit symbols which is
expressed as:
Λ2 = (
∑
j 6=i
U i
−1U js
(t)
j s
(t)
j
H
U j
HUHi
−1
)−1
[(
∑
j 6=i
U i
−1U js
(t)
j s
(t)
j
H
U j
HUHi
−1
) + s
(t)
i s
(t)
i
H
]
(4.35)
with RI and Rd, we can have
Λ2 = I +U
H
i R
−1
I U iRd, (4.36)
By adding log to (4.36), we obtain
ϕS−SR = maxφi∈ϕ,ϕ∈Ψ
{
log
( det[I + Γr,i]
det[I +UHi R
−1
I U iRd]
)}
, (4.37)
which is equivalent to (5.40). In the derivation, we assume the channel matrices of the users
have the same size as the channel of the eavesdroppers and the matrices are full rank.
Based on the proposed S-SR criterion, the relay selection in the buffer-aided relay system can
be implemented according to Algorithm 6. The substitution of steps 7, 22 and 33 are given
as steps 7, 24 and 35 in Algorithm 6 which require only the channel and signal information
to the corresponding relays and users.
As a conclusion, in Table 4.1, the required information to do the relay selection are listed.
Among all investigated relay selection approaches, S-SR can achieve high secrecy rate per-
formance without the channel information to the eavesdroppers in a relay system.
4.5 Simulation Results
In this section, we assess the secrecy rate performance in a multiuser MIMO downlink relay
system via simulations. Zero-forcing precoding is adopted and we assume that the channel
for each user is uncorrelated with the remaining channels and the channel gains are generated
following a complex circular Gaussian random variable with zero mean and unit variance.
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Algorithm 6 Relay selection algorithm with S-SR criterion
1: Ω0 = Ω
2: for k = 1 : T do
3: for i = 1 : φtotal do
4: if Q(i) = 0 then
5: RI = H i
−1H iH
−1
+
∑M
j 6=iU js
(t)
j s
(t)
j
H
U j
H
6: Rd = U is
(t)
i s
(t)
i
H
U i
H
7: θφi = log
(
det[I+Γr,i]
det[I+UHi R
−1
I U iRd]
)
8: Q(i) = Q(i) + 1
9: else
10: θφi = 0
11: end if
12: end for
13: ϕselectk = maxφi∈Ω0{θφi}
14: ηk = θϕselectk
15: Ω0 = [1 2 · · · φi − 1 φi + 1 · · ·φtotal]
16: end for
17: ˆηS−SR1 =
∑T
k=1 ηk
18: Ω1 = Ω
19: for r = 1 : M do
20: for i = 1 : φtotal do
21: if Q(i) 6= 0 then
22: RI = Hφir
−1Hφir
H−1∑M
j 6=i yφjyφj
H
23: Rd = yφiyφi
H
24: θφi = log
(
det[I+(HφirRIH
H
φir
)
−1
(HφirRdH
H
φir
)]
det[I+R−1I Rd]
)
25: Q(i) = Q(i)− 1
26: else
27: θφi = 0
28: end if
29: end for
30: ϕselectr = maxφi∈Ω1{θφi}
31: ηr = θϕselectr
32: Ω1 = [1 2 · · · φi − 1 φi + 1 · · ·φtotal]
33: end for
34: ˆηS−SR2 =
∑M
r=1 ηr
35: ϕselect = maxϕ ( ˆηS−SR1 , ˆηS−SR2)
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Table 4.1: Comparison of different relay selection algorithms
Relay selection ap-
proach
Required information Summary
Max-ratio (4.5) User or relay chan-
nel information
Eavesdropper
channel informa-
tion
Low complexity,
low secrecy rate
performance
SINR (4.8) All channel infor-
mation
Covariance matrix
of transmit signal
and interference
High complexity,
hard to achieve in
reality
Secrecy rate (4.11) All channel infor-
mation
Covariance matrix
of transmit signal
and interference
Best secrecy
rate performance
requiring most
information
Simplified SINR
(S-SINR) (4.25)
User or relay chan-
nel information
Low complexity
and high secrecy
rate performance
Simplified secrecy-
based (S-SR)
(4.26)
User or relay chan-
nel information
covariance matrix
of transmit signal
and interference
Close to the best
secrecy rate per-
formance with
partial channel
information
The details of the simulation parameters are given in Table 4.2.
Table 4.2: Simulation Parameters for Single-antenna and MIMO scenario
Parameter Symbol Single-antenna MIMO
Number of transmit antennas Nt 3 6
Number of antennas for each relay Ni 1 2
Number of antennas for each user Nr 1 2
Number of antennas for each eavesdropper Ne 1 2
Number of relays T 5 5
Number of buffer size L 1 1
Number of users M 3 3
Number of eavesdroppers N 3 3
In Fig. 5.8 single-antenna scenario, the SINR and SR criteria have a comparable SR perfor-
mance. However, the SINR criterion requires the interference knowledge and the SR criterion
needs the channels of the eavesdroppers, which are both impractical. The proposed S-SR algo-
rithm only requires the channels to the relays and the legitimate users and can achieve almost
the same SR performance as the SR criterion with full channel knowledge. The proposed
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Figure 4.2: Single antenna (Nt = 3, Nr = Ni = Nk = 1, T = 5,M = N = 3) and MIMO (Nt =
6, Nr = Ni = Nk = 2, T = 5,M = N = 3) multi-user system secrecy rate performance with different
relay selection criteria
S-SINR algorithm suffers a larger degradation than that of the SR criterion.
In Fig. 4.3, we compare the SR performance for scenarios with square and equal channel
matrices and that with the zeros filled out. When we decrease the number of eavesdroppers,
the SR performance improves. In this scenario, the proposed S-SR relay selection algorithm
can still perform close to the SR relay selection criterion with full information.
Figure 4.4 shows the secrecy rate performance in the presence of different relay numbers for
the single-antenna and the MIMO scenarios. Higher number of relays provide a better spatial
advantage which contributes to the increase of the secrecy rate. According to Figure 4.4, in
the scenario with full CSI knowledge, the SINR criterion and SR criterion can achieve the
same secrecy rate performance. However, it also leads to a higher computational complexity.
Furthermore, in Figure 4.5, simplified criteria are compared along with different numbers of
relays. The S-SR criterion provides the best SR performance among all investigated criteria.
With more relays distributed between the source and users, the SR performance can be
further improved by employing the proposed S-SR and S-SINR algorithms.
In the simulation, we assume perfect CSI is achievable in the criteria calculation. For a
scenario with imperfect CSI, there is a performance degradation for all curves as expected
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Figure 4.3: Secrecy rate performance with different relay selection criteria in full-rank (Nt = 6, Nr =
Ni = Nk = 2, T = 5,M = N = 3) and rank-deficient (Nt = 6, Nr = Ni = Nk = 2, T = 5,M = 3, N =
2) systems
but the proposed algorithms still outperform the Max-ratio approach.
4.6 Summary
In this work, we have proposed effective multiple-relay selection algorithms for multiuser
MIMO relay systems to enhance the legitimate users’ transmission. The proposed algorithms
exploit the use of the available channel information to perform relay selection. Simulation
results show that the proposed algorithms can provide a significantly better secrecy rate
performance than existing approaches.
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Figure 4.4: Effect of different numbers of relays T = 5 (dash line), T = 20 (solid line) on the secrecy
rate performance with full CSI knowledge in single-antenna (Nt = 3, Nr = Ni = Nk = 1,M = N = 3)
and MIMO (Nt = 6, Nr = Ni = Nk = 2,M = N = 3) scenarios.
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5.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we investigate an opportunistic relaying and jamming scheme and develop
relay selection algorithms for multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) buffer-aided downlink
relay networks with physical layer security constraints. The proposed relaying and jamming
function selection (RJFS) algorithms select multiple relay nodes as well as multiple jamming
nodes to assist the transmission. In the proposed RJFS algorithm inter-relay interference
cancellation (IC) techniques are taken into account. Firstly, IC is implemented to improve
the transmission rate to legitimate users. Secondly, the inter-relay interference (IRI) is applied
to amplify the jamming signal to the eavesdroppers. In particular, we consider a buffer-aided
system in which the jamming signal can be stored at the relay nodes and a buffer-aided
relaying and jamming function selection (BF-RJFS) algorithm is proposed. In both RJFS
and BF-RJFS algorithms, a relay selection strategy is developed to maximize the secrecy rate
based on exhaustive searches. Greedy RJFS and BF-RJFS algorithms are then developed for
relay selection with reduced complexity. Simulation results show that the proposed RJFS and
BF-RJFS algorithms can achieve a higher secrecy rate performance than previously reported
techniques even in the absence of channel state information of the eavesdroppers.
5.1.1 Prior and Related Work
Research on buffer-aided relay systems with secure constraints has been carried out in half-
duplex and full-duplex systems. In [51], the system model is described as one source, one half-
duplex decode-and-forward (DF) buffer relay and one destination. Regarding the availability
of the channel state information at the transmitter (CSIT), fixed-rate transmission and mixed-
rate transmission schemes are proposed in this study. Based on the instantaneous signal-to-
noise ratio (SNR) of the source-relay and relay-destination links the approach in [51] gives a
solution to the throughput-optimal problem. Then in [12], with one eavesdropper which can
intercept data from both the source and relay nodes, secure transmission is investigated in
a half-duplex buffer-aided cooperative wireless network. A max-ratio relay selection policy
in a single-antenna system is developed to optimize the secrecy transmission rate with the
consideration of exact and average gain eavesdropper channel strength scenarios. The studies
in [75; 76] have investigated physical-layer security in MIMO systems. Furthermore, in [13]
a two-hop half-duplex buffer-aided relay system is studied, where a relay selection which
adapts reception and transmission time slots based on the channel quality is proposed and
the selection thresholds are set to maximize the secrecy throughput or minimize the secrecy
5.1. Introduction 87
outage probability (SOP). Half-duplex systems avoid the IRI occurred in the relay poll,
however, the transmission rate is reduced by the use of two time slots. This can be further
complicated by the need for two or more time slots for the transmission with buffers at relay
nodes and the associated delay constraints. Compared with half-duplex systems, full-duplex
systems can provide higher transmission rates [77]
Opportunistic relay schemes have recently been applied to buffer-aided systems [14], [15] and
[78]. In this context, inter-relay interference cancellation (IC) at relay nodes is a fundamental
aspect in opportunistic relay schemes. In [14], IC has been combined with buffer-aided relays
and power adaptation to mitigate inter-relay interference (IRI) and minimize the energy
expenditure. In a point-to-point system, a new relay selection policy is analyzed in terms of
outage probability and diversity. Furthermore, in [15] a distributed joint relay-pair selection
has been proposed with the aim of rate maximization in each time slot. Examining the
feasibility of IC at the relay nodes, the study in [15] derives the threshold to avoid increased
relay-pair switching and CSI acquisition. Based on relay selection techniques, in [78] and
[79], a jammer selection algorithm and a joint relay and jammer selection technique have
been investigated. The studies in [78] and [79] show that relaying contributes to a better
transmission rate for legitimate users, whereas jamming can deteriorate the transmission to
the eavesdropper. Therefore, relaying and jamming leads to an improvement in secrecy rate
performance. However, there are few works which consider the combination of opportunistic
buffer-aided relay schemes with jamming techniques for improving physical layer security.
5.1.2 Contributions
In this chapter, we investigate an opportunistic relaying and jamming scheme and develop re-
lay selection algorithms for the downlink of multiuser multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO)
buffer-aided relay networks with the constraints of physical layer security. We focus on
the downlink channel and the secrecy rate performance of the proposed scheme and algo-
rithms. Unlike the IC focus of [14], we examine an opportunistic relaying and jamming
scheme along with relay selection algorithms. The proposed relaying and jamming function
selection (RJFS) algorithms, whose preliminary results were reported in [80], select multiple
relay nodes as well as multiple jamming nodes to assist the transmission. In particular, based
on the opportunistic jamming selection performed with independent groups of jammers [78],
we consider an opportunistic relaying and jamming scheme in which relaying or jamming is
performed within the same set of relays at different time slots. The proposed opportunistic
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relaying and jamming scheme is capable of achieving a high secrecy rate than recently re-
ported approaches. In the proposed RJFS algorithm jamming is taken into account. Firstly,
jamming is employed to improve the transmission rate to legitimate users. Secondly, The
remaining interference is leveraged to amplify the jamming signal to the eavesdroppers. We
also consider a buffer-aided system in which the jamming signal can be stored at the relay
nodes and a buffer-aided relaying and jamming function selection (BF-RJFS) algorithm is
proposed. In both RJFS and BF-RJFS algorithms, a relay selection strategy is developed
to maximize the secrecy rate based on an exhaustive search. Greedy RJFS and BF-RJFS
algorithms are then developed for relay selection with reduced complexity. Simulation results
show that the proposed RJFS and BF-RJFS algorithms can outperform recently reported
techniques in the absence of channel state information of the eavesdroppers. In addition,
the proposed greedy RJFS and BF-RJFS algorithms achieve a close performance to the pro-
posed exhaustive search-based RJFS and BF-RJFS algorithms, while requiring a much lower
computational cost. The main contributions of the chapter are:
• An opportunistic relaying and jamming scheme for multiuser MIMO networks with
buffer-aided relay nodes.
• Novel relaying and jamming function selection algorithms, denoted RJFS and BF-RJFS,
are developed for multi-user MIMO systems with multiple relay nodes.
• A selection criterion is devised for the RJFS and BF-RJFS algorithms which does not
require the CSI to the eavesdroppers.
• Greedy RJFS and BF-RJFS algorithms are developed to reduce the computational
complexity of exhaustive search-based RJFS and BF-RJFS algorithms.
• Secrecy rate analysis of the proposed relaying and jamming selection algorithms.
5.2 System Model and Performance Metrics
In this section, a brief introduction to the buffer-aided relay system model is given along with
details of the proposed opportunistic relaying and jamming scheme. In addition, the problem
formulation of physical layer security associated with the proposed opportunistic relaying and
jamming scheme is detailed.
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5.2.1 System Model
Figure 5.1 gives a description of an opportunistic multiuser MIMO relay system with Nt
antennas employed to transmit the data streams to M users in the presence of N eavesdrop-
pers. In the relay selection scheme, S represents the number of selected relay nodes. To show
the states of the relays, the matrix Lstate ∈ CStotalNi×L is introduced. Each column of the
matrix Lstate represents the signals stored in the buffers in one time slot. The initial elements
in the buffer state matrix are zeros. Similar to traditional relay systems, the transmission
can be divided into two parts, Link I and Link II, respectively. In Fig. 5.1, the solid lines
represent the transmission of intended signals and dashed lines denote the transmission of
jamming signals. The key difference of an opportunistic scheme is that at the same time slot
the relays can be selected to perform different functions. Depending on the relay buffer size,
the opportunistic scheme can be considered in two scenarios:
• Buffer size L = 1: In the first time slot, only Link I occurs. In the following trans-
mission, Link I and Link II happens in the same time slot. This scenario is equivalent
to that of relays without buffers.
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• Buffer size L > 1: Thresholds η are calculated separately for Link I and Link II and
relays performing relaying or jamming are determined.
– If ηLinkI > ηLinkII, Link I occurs. It indicates that the channels from the source
to the relays can provide a better transmission environment. In this scenario, the
jamming signals are generated independently at the relays which are selected to
perform jamming function. The selection of the relays which perform the relay-
ing function can be done according to different relay selection criteria. And the
selection of the relays which perform jamming can be achieved in the remaining
relays based on the feasibility of IRI cancellation . The jamming signal will also
be stored at the buffers.
– If ηLinkI ≤ ηLinkII, Link II transmissions occur. It indicates that the channels from
the relays to the users can provide a better transmission environment. In this
scenario, relays will forward the signals to the destination. The jamming signals
in Link II are the stored jamming signals in Link I which means that the jamming
signals in Link II do not need to be generated independently in Link II.
Figure 5.2: Relaying and Jamming function in buffer state matrix
In Fig. 5.2, we take a StotalNi × L buffer state matrices as an example. The buffer state
matrix are shown with relaying and jamming function relays. In Link I, the received signals
as well as the jamming signal will be stored in the first zero column from the right side of
the matrix. In Link II, the first non-zero column counting from the right side of the matrix
will be transmitted to the user and at the same time an all-zero column will be added to the
left of the matrix. The transmission follows a first in first out procedure.
Each relay node is equipped with Ni antennas. To indicate the difference when the relays are
performing the jamming function, the number of relay antennas is represented by Nk. For
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one relay we can have Nk = Ni. At the receiver side each user and eavesdropper is equipped
with Nr and Ne receive antennas, respectively.
In this system, we assume that the eavesdroppers do not jam the transmission and the data
transmitted to each user, relay, jammer and eavesdropper experience a flat-fading MIMO
channel. The quantities H i ∈ CNi×Nt and He ∈ CNe×Nt denote the channel matrices of
the ith relay and the eth eavesdropper, respectively. The quantities Hke ∈ CNe×Nk and
Hkr ∈ CNr×Nk denote the channel matrices of the kth jammer to the eth eavesdropper and
the kth jammer to the rth user, respectively. The channel between the kth relay to the ith
relay is represented by Hki ∈ CNi×Nk . To support the transmission of data to M users,
the source is equipped with Nt > NrM antennas. The number of antennas equipped with
relaying function nodes as well as the jamming function nodes should satisfy NiS > NrM
and NkK > NrM , respectively. In order to satisfy the precoding constraints that the total
number of transmit antennas should be larger than the total number of receive antennas,
we assume that NrM transmit antennas are used to transmit signals to M users. We also
assume that the total number of antennas of the eavesdroppers is NeN > NrM [6; 81].
The vector s
(t)
i ∈ CNi×1 represents the data symbols to be transmitted corresponding to each
user in time slot t. The total transmit signal at the transmitter can be expressed as:
s(t) =
[
s
(t)
1
T
s
(t)
2
T
s
(t)
3
T · · · s(t)M
T
]T
. (5.1)
In prior work [82; 83], precoding techniques have been applied to mitigate the interference
between different users. In this work, we adopt for simplicity linear zero-forcing precoding
and the precoding matrix can be described by
U (t) = H(t)
H
(H(t)H(t)
H
)−1. (5.2)
With U i ∈ CNt×Ni , the total precoding matrix can be expressed as
U (t) =
[
U
(t)
1 U
(t)
2 U
(t)
3 · · · U (t)M
]
, (5.3)
and the total channel matrix to S selected relays is given by
H(t) =
[
H
(t)
1
T
H
(t)
2
T
H
(t)
3
T · · · H(t)S
T
]T
∈ CSNi×Nt , (5.4)
if the number of antennas equipped at each relay and each user are the same, the minimum
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required number of relays is S = M . The channels of the selected relays forwarding the
signals to the rth user are described by
HKr
(t) =
[
H
(t)
1r H
(t)
2r H
(t)
3r · · · H(t)Kr
]
∈ CNr×KNk (5.5)
and the total channel from relays to users is,
H
(t)
M =
[
H
(t)
K1
T
H
(t)
K2
T
H
(t)
K3
T · · · H(t)KM
T
]T
∈ CMNr×KNk . (5.6)
The selected relays also perform jamming for the Link I transmission to the eavesdroppers,
whereas the channels of the jammers to the ith relay are given by
HKi
(t) =
[
H
(t)
1i H
(t)
2i H
(t)
3i · · · H(t)Ki
]
∈ CNi×KNk . (5.7)
In each link, the received signal y
(t)
i ∈ CNi×1 at each relay node can be expressed as:
y
(t)
i = H iU is
(t)
i +
∑
j 6=i
H iU js
(t)
j +H
(t)
KiJ + ni (5.8)
In (5.8), ni ∈ CN (0, σ) and the superscript pt designates the previous time slot when the
signal is stored as a jamming signal in the buffer at the relay nodes. The symbol σ represents
the noise variance at the relay. The termHKiy
(pt) is regarded as the IRI between the ith relay
and the K jammers. The total jamming signal y(pt) = [y
(pt1)
1
T
y
(pt2)
2
T · · · y(ptK)K
T
]T is
chosen as the jamming signal according to a signal-to-interference and noise ratio (SINR)
criterion, which is explained later on in this work. The superscript pt represents the previous
time slot and due to the characteristics of buffer relay nodes, the values can be different for
each relay node According to the theorem in [14], IRI can be eliminated. The jammers are
targeted towards the eth eavesdropper channel described by
HKe
(t) =
[
H
(t)
1e H
(t)
2e H
(t)
3e · · · H(t)Ke
]
∈ CNe×KNk (5.9)
The received signal at the eth eavesdropper is then given by
y(t)e = HeU is
(t)
i +
∑
j 6=i
HeU js
(t)
j +H
(t)
KeJ + ne. (5.10)
where ne ∈ CN (0, σ) is the noise vector at the eavesdropper. For the eavesdropper, the term
H
(t)
Key
(pt) acts as the jamming signal and this jamming signal can not be removed without
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the knowledge of the channel from the kth jammer to the eth eavesdropper.
If we assume that the transmitted signals from the relays to the users are expressed as r(t)
which is the last column in the buffer state matrix. The received signal at the destination is
expressed by
y(t)r = HMr
(t) + nr. (5.11)
where nr ∈ CN (0, σ) is the noise vector from the relays to users.
In the existing IRI scenario, based on (5.8), when the transmit signals s are independent
with unit average energy E[ssH ] = I, the SINR at relay node i Γ (t)IRI−i can be expressed as:
Γ
(t)
IRI−i =
γSi,Ri
ϕ(k, i)γRK ,Ri + γSj ,Ri +Ni
, (5.12)
where γm,n represents the instantaneous received signal power for the links m −→ n as
described by
γSi,Ri = ‖H iUi‖F, γSj ,Ri = ‖
∑
j 6=i
H iUj‖F, (5.13)
γRK ,Ri = ‖HKiJ‖F. (5.14)
The SINR at the eth eavesdropper node Γ
(t)
e as well as the rth legitimate user Γ
(t)
r can be
expressed as:
Γ
(t)
IRI−e =
γSi,Ee
γRK ,Ee + γSj ,Ee +Ne
, (5.15)
and
Γ
(t)
IRI−r =
γRk,Rr
γRK ,Rr +Nr
, (5.16)
where the terms in (5.15) and (5.16) are given by
γSi,Ee = ‖HeUi‖F, γSj ,Ee = ‖
∑
j 6=i
HeUj‖F, (5.17)
γRK ,Ee = ‖HKeJ‖F (5.18)
and
γRk,Rr = ‖HkrJk‖F. (5.19)
γRK ,Rr = ‖HKrJ −HkrJk‖F. (5.20)
Depending on the IRI conditions at the relay nodes, two types of scheme can be applied:
IRI or jamming. According to [14], if we assume E[ssH ] = I and E[y(pt)y(pt)H ] = I, the
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feasibility of jamming can be described by a factor ϕ(K, i) which is expressed as:
ϕ(K, i) =

0 if det
(
(H iH
H
i + I)
−1HKiHHKi
)
> γ0
1 otherwise,
(5.21)
where ϕ(K, i) = 0 means the interference can be amplified in the received signal at the relays.
The quantity γ0 is the threshold set to evaluate the feasibility of jamming.
In this scenario, jamming can be performed at the relay nodes by setting ϕ(K, i) = 0. The
SINR expressions at relay node i, eavesdropper e and receiver r can be respectively expressed
as:
Γ
(t)
IC−i =
γSi,Ri
γSj ,Ri +Ni
, Γ
(t)
IC−e =
γSi,Ee
γRK ,Ee + γSj ,Ee +Ne
(5.22)
and
Γ
(t)
IC−r =
γRk,Rr
γRK ,Rr +Nr
. (5.23)
5.2.2 Problem Formulation
In this subsection, we describe the secrecy rate used in the literature to assess the performance
of the proposed algorithms in physical layer security research. The MIMO system secrecy
capacity is expressed as [18]:
Cs = max
Qs0,Tr(Qs)=Es
log(det(I +HbaQsH
H
ba))
− log(det(I +HeaQsHHea)),
(5.24)
where Qs is the covariance matrix associated with the signal and Hba and Hea represent
the links between the source to the users and the eavesdroppers, respectively. For the relay
system [78], according to (5.8) and (5.11), with equal power P allocated to the transmitter
and the relays, the achievable rate of the users can be expressed as:
Rr = log(det(I + Γ
(t)
r )) (5.25)
where Γ
(t)
r according to (5.16) is given by
Γ(t)r =
P∑K
k=1Nk
HKrH
H
Kr(I +
P
Nt
H(pt)UptUpt
H
H(pt)
H
). (5.26)
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Similarly, for the eavesdropper the achievable rate with the assumption that a global knowl-
edge for all the links available can be expressed as:
Re = log(det(I + Γ
(t)
e )) (5.27)
and the Γ
(t)
e,i according to (5.15) is described by
Γ(t)e = (I +∆)
−1 P
Nt
HeUU
HHe
H , (5.28)
where
∆ =
N∑
e=1
P∑K
k=1Nk
HKeH
H
Ke(I +
P
Nt
H(pt)UptUpt
H
H(pt)
H
). (5.29)
In (5.28), ∆ represents the jamming signal to the eavesdropper. Using (5.25) and (5.27) the
secrecy rate for the multiple users can be expressed as:
R =
T∑
r=1
N∑
e=1
[Rr −Re]+ (5.30)
where [x]+ = max(0, x).
Our objective is to select the set of relay nodes to perform relaying or jamming in order to
maximize the secrecy rate. Therefore, the proposed optimization problem can be formulated
as:
maximize
k,i
R
subject to k, i ∈ Ψ
(5.31)
where Ψ represents the relay node poll, and k and i denote the kth selected jamming function
node and ith relaying function node, respectively.
5.2.3 Relay Selection Algorithms
In the conventional relaying or jamming systems, relays often serve as the receiver and as the
transmitter in order to enhance the reliability of the signal transmission from the source to
the destination. We first review several algorithmic solutions under this conventional relay
scenario and then describe an approach to relay selection without channel state information
(CSI) to the eavesdroppers.
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Conventional Selection
The conventional selection does not take the jamming function of relay nodes into account
and the relay nodes are selected with different selection criteria to assist the transmission
between the source and the destination without consideration of eavesdroppers [71] or with
only one eavesdropper [12].
In [71], a max-min relay selection has been considered as the optimal selection scheme for
conventional decode-and-forward (DF) relay setups. In a single-antenna scenario the relay
selection policy is given by
Rmax−mini = maxRi∈Ψ min(‖hS,Ri‖2, ‖hRi,D‖2) (5.32)
where hS,Rk is the channel gain between the source and the relay and hRk,D is the channel
gain between the relay k and the destination. Similarly, a max-link approach has also been
introduced to relax the limitation that the source and the relay transmission must be fixed.
The max-link relay selection strategy can be described by
Rmax−linki =maxRi∈Ψ
( ⋃
Ri∈ζ:ϕ(Qp)6=L
‖hS,Ri‖2,
⋃
Ri∈Ψ:ϕ(Qp)6=0
‖hRi,D‖2
) (5.33)
With the consideration of the eavesdropper, a max-ratio selection policy is proposed in [12]
and is expressed by
Rmax−ratioi = maxRi∈Ψ (η1, η2) (5.34)
with
η1 =
maxRi∈Ψ:ϕ(Qp)6=L ‖hS,Ri‖2
‖hse‖2 (5.35)
η2 = max
Ri∈Ψ:ϕ(Qp)6=0
‖hRi,D‖2
‖hRie‖2
(5.36)
The aforementioned relay selection procedure is based on CSI. In [79] a conventional selection
as well as the optimal selection based on the signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio (SINR)
criterion are reported.
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Optimal Selection (OS)
Since the conventional selection reported in [79] may not support systems with secrecy con-
straints, we consider optimal selection (OS) which takes the eavesdropper into consideration.
The SINR of OS in the downlink of the multiuser MIMO relay systems under consideration
can be expressed similarly to (5.15) and (5.16) as is described by
Γ (t)e =
γS,Ee
Neσ2e
(5.37)
and
Γ (t)r =
γRk,Rr
Nrσ2r
. (5.38)
The OS algorithm is given by
ROS = max[Rr −Re]+
= max[log(1 + Γ (t)r ))− log(1 + Γ (t)e )]+
(5.39)
Relay Selection without CSI to Eavesdroppers
IIn the previously described relay selection algorithms, the CSI to the eavesdroppers is an un-
avoidable assumption in the design of relay selection techniques based on secrecy constraints.
However, in the optimization problem in (5.31), the global instantaneous information of the
eavesdropper’s CSI is hard to obtain and often not available. In order to circumvent this
limitation, we propose a novel relay selection criterion without CSI to the eavesdroppers to
be incorporated in the multiuser MIMO relay system under study. The details of this relay
selection criterion are given in Appendix. The so-called simplified secrecy rate (S-SR) based
multiple relay selection is expressed by
ϕS−SR = max
φi∈ϕ,ϕ∈Ψ
{
log
(
det [I + Γr,i]
)
− log ( det [I +UHi R−1I U iRd])}, (5.40)
where the covariance matrix of the interference and the signal can be described as RI =
H i
−1H iH
−1
+
∑
j 6=iU js
(t)
j s
(t)
j
H
U j
H and Rd = U is
(t)
i s
(t)
i
H
U i
H , respectively. In (5.40), no
CSI to the eavesdroppers is required and the criterion only depends on the channel information
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to the intended receiver and the covariance matrix of the interference and the signal. In the
following proposed relaying and jamming schemes, the S-SR technique is applied to avoid the
requirement for global instantaneous information of the eavesdropper’s CSI.
5.3 Selection with Jamming Function Relays
In this section novel approaches to relaying and jamming function selection are presented. We
start with a simple single-antenna scenario and then consider the MIMO scenario. Moreover,
we also develop a relaying and jamming function selection for multiuser MIMO buffer-aided
relay systems.
5.3.1 Relaying and Jamming Function Selection (RJFS)
We assume that the total number of relay nodes is Stotal and Ω represents the total relay
set. To apply the opportunistic scheme in the system, an initial state is set according to the
channel:
Ω0 = max
Ω0
det
(
HΩ0HΩ0
H
)
, (5.41)
in the initial state, we assume the relays will not perform jamming function. S relay nodes
are selected according to the criterion. With the total number of relaying and jamming
nodes Stotal and the number of selected nodes in each group S, the selection operation can
be expressed as:
Ψ =
(
Stotal
S
)
, (5.42)
where Ψ represents total sets of T-combination and in each set there are S number of selected
relaying or jamming nodes. For a particular selected set Ωm, we assume HΩm represents
the total channel matrix of selected sets, then the corresponding channel for set m can be
described by
HΩm =
[
H
(t)
Ωm1
T
H
(t)
Ωm2
T
H
(t)
Ωm3
T · · · H(t)ΩSm
T
]T
. (5.43)
If the total collection of selected sets is represented by ΨRelaying, for each set the relay selection
is given by
Ωm = maxΩm∈ΨRelaying
∑
φi∈Ωm
{
log
(
det (Γ
(t)
Ωm)
)− log ( det (Γ(t)Ωe))} (5.44)
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where
Γ
(t)
Ωm = I + (H iR
Ωm
I H
H
i )
−1(H iRΩ
m
d H
H
i ) (5.45)
and
Γ
(t)
Ωe = I +U
H
i R
Ωm
I
−1
U iR
Ωm
d (5.46)
In (5.45) and (5.46), the covariance matricesRΩ
m
d can be obtained in the same way illustrated
in (5.40). The only difference of the proposed RJFS algorithm resides in the calculation of
RΩ
m
I , apart from the interference from different users, there is also existing interference
from the jamming function relay nodes. With the same distributions of the channels from
the jamming function relay nodes to the eavesdropper, the interference RΩ
m
I can be also
calculated in a similar way to that shown in (5.40). In Algorithm 7 the main steps for relay
selection are given.
Algorithm 7 RJFS Algorithm
1: for t = 1 : S do
2: for q = 1 : Stotal do
3: Γq = maxq∈Ω det(HqHqH)
4: end for
5: Ω0t = q
6: end for
7: ΨRelaying =
(
Stotal
S
)
8: [Ωc Ωr] = size(ΨRelaying)
9: for m = 1 : Ωc do
10: Γ
(t)
Ωm = I + (H iR
Ωm
I H
H
i )
−1(H iRΩ
m
d H
H
i )
11: Γ
(t)
Ωe = I +U
H
i R
Ωm
I
−1
U iR
Ωm
d
12: Ωm = maxΩm∈ΨRelaying
∑
φi∈Ωm
{
log
(
det (Γ
(t)
Ωm)
)− log ( det (Γ(t)Ωe))}
13: end for
In Algorithm 7, from step 1 to step 7, S relay nodes are selected out of Stotal relay nodes. To
simplify the initialization, the S relay nodes are selected one by one. The loop from step 2
to step 4 is used to investigate all relay nodes. Ω0 contains the initial relay nodes and these
nodes will have the initial signal HΩ0s0 + n0 from the relays to the users. With no buffers
implemented at relay nodes, RJFS only selects the relays in Link I. The relays used in Link
II is the same as the selected relays in Link I in previous time slot.
5.3.2 Buffer-aided Relaying and Jamming Function Selection (BF-RJFS)
Here we described the proposed BF-RJFS algorithm, which exploits relays equipped with
buffers. Based on the RJFS algorithm, the selection of the S relays used for signal reception
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is the same as that in the buffer relay scenario. The main difference between the proposed
BF-RJFS and RJFS algorithms relies on the selection of the jammer. In the following, we
will detail the jammer selection procedure. The selection of the set of jamming relays is
performed simultaneously. According to (5.44), we assume the corresponding threshold is
expressed as CΩm . Given the total collection of jamming selects ΨJamming, the remaining
relays are selected according to the S-SR criterion outlined as described by
Ωr = maxΩr∈ΨJamming
∑
φi∈Ωr
{
log
(
det (Γ
(t)
Ωr,n)
)− log ( det (Γ(t)Ωr,e))} (5.47)
where Γ
(t)
Ωr,n is given by
Γ
(t)
Ωr,n = I + (HΩrR
BF
I H
H
Ωr)
−1(HΩrRBFd H
H
Ωr), (5.48)
where RBFd is the covariance matrix of the transmit signal from the jamming function relay
nodes to the users. The jamming function is the same as the received relaying signal in
previous time slots. The calculation of RBFd depends on (5.20) and R
BF
I relies on (5.17) and
(5.18). In this procedure, the calculation for the transmission to eavesdroppers is given by
Γ
(t)
Ωr,e = I +U
H
r R
BF
I
−1
U rR
BF
d (5.49)
where the relays used for jamming in the next time slot are selected. With the selection of
receiving relays and jamming relays the system can provide a better secrecy performance as
compared to conventional relay systems. In Algorithm 8 the main steps are outlined.
In Algorithm 8, step 2 to step 7 are eliminating the relay nodes with empty buffer because
empty buffer relay nodes can not perform relaying function. Step 14 to step 19 are eliminating
relay nodes with full buffer as the signals from the source can not be stored in these relay
nodes.
5.3.3 Greedy Algorithm in Relay Selection
In both RJFS and BF-RJFS algorithms, exhaustive searches are implemented to select the
relaying and jamming nodes. The incorporation of a greedy strategy in both RJFS and BF-
RJFS algorithms can significantly reduce the computational cost of the proposed exhaustive
search-based RJFS and BF-RJFS algorithms.
In the presence of multiple relays, exhaustive search is capable of achieving optimal relay
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Algorithm 8 BF-RJFS Algorithm
1: loop
2: Q = Lstate(:, L)
3: for q = 1 : Stotal do
4: if Q(qNi) = 0 then
5: Ω/q = [1 2 · · · q − 1 q + 1 · · ·Stotal]
6: end if
7: end for
8: Ω1c = length(Ω)
9: for r = 1 : Ωc
1 do
10: Γ
(t)
Ωr,n = I + (HΩrR
BF
I H
H
Ωr)
−1(HΩrRBFd H
H
Ωr)
11: Γ
(t)
Ωr,e = I +U
H
r R
BF
I
−1
U rR
BF
d
12: [ηLinkII Ω
r] = maxΩr∈ΨRelaying
∑
φi∈Ωr
{
log
(
det (Γ
(t)
Ωr,n)
)− log ( det (Γ(t)Ωr,e))}
13: end for
14: Q = Lstate(:, 1)
15: for q = 1 : Stotal do
16: if Q(qNi) 6= 0 then
17: Ω/q = [1 2 · · · q − 1 q + 1 · · ·Stotal]
18: end if
19: end for
20: Ω2 = length(Ω)
21: ΨJamming =
(
Ω2
S
)
22: [Ωc
2 Ωr
2] = size(ΨJamming)
23: for m = 1 : Ωc
2 do
24: Γ
(t)
Ωm = I + (H iR
Ωm
I H
H
i )
−1(H iRΩ
m
d H
H
i )
25: Γ
(t)
Ωe = I +U
H
i R
Ωm
I
−1
U iR
Ωm
d
26: [ηLinkI Ω
m] = maxΩm∈ΨJamming
∑
φi∈Ωm
{
log
(
det (Γ
(t)
Ωm)
)− log ( det (Γ(t)Ωe))}
27: end for
28: end loop
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selection with S-SR criterion. However, it leads to an exponential increase in computational
complexity. To reduce the complexity of the algorithm while maintaining the high secrecy
rate performance, we employ greedy search instead of exhaustive search.
In an exhaustive search, all possible combinations are investigated to obtain optimal results.
In contrast, a greedy search implements the calculation with individual relays and in every
iteration of the greedy search, the relay with best output threshold is selected. Then in the
next iteration the remaining relays are calculated in the same way. The selection process
continues until the necessary relays are selected. The total number of considered relays can
be calculated with the following expression as:
Ωc = Stotal + Stotal − 1 + · · ·+ Stotal − S. (5.50)
From (5.50), we can see that total number of request investigate relays is increased linearly to
the total number of relays which contributes to the reduction of computational complexity.
In the following we describe the proposed greedy RJFS algorithm. Here we choose relays
according to the S-SR criterion. When the K relays that forward the signals to the users are
determined, the relays used for signal reception are chosen based on the S-SR criterion, as
given by
m = maxm∈Ω
[
log
(
det (Γ(t)m )
)− log ( det (Γ(t)e ))] (5.51)
where φm represents the selected relays and Γ
(t)
m corresponds to the mth relay which is
calculated based on (5.12) and is given by
Γ(t)m = I + (HmR
m
I H
H
m)
−1(HmRmd H
H
m), (5.52)
and Γ
(t)
e is described by
Γ(t)e = I +U
H
mR
m
I
−1UmRmd (5.53)
Instead of the exhaustive search of the selected set Ωm, the mth relay is calculated with the
aim of finding the relay that provides the highest secrecy rate based on φm. In (5.52), R
m
d
and RmI are obtained in the same way as in (5.45) and (5.46).
The main steps are described in Algorithm 9. Similarly to the BF-RJFS algorithm, the
greedy-BF-RJFS algorithm substitutes the exhaustive search of all combinations with a
greedy search of individual relays. The main difference is the selection of jamming relays.
Specifically, for a particular user r each relay computes a threshold and the relay k with the
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Algorithm 9 Greedy-RJFS Algorithm
1: for t = 1 : S do
2: for q = 1 : Stotal do
3: Γq = maxq∈Ω det(HqHqH)
4: end for
5: Γt
0 = Γq
6: Ω/q = [1 2 · · · q − 1 q + 1 · · ·Ωtotal]
7: end for
8: Ω0 = length(Ω)
9: for t = 1 : T do
10: for m = 1 : Ω0 do
11: Γ
(t)
m = I + (HmR
m
I H
H
m)
−1(HmRmd H
H
m)
12: Γ
(t)
e = I +U
H
mR
m
I
−1UmRmd
13: m = maxm∈Ω[log
(
det (Γ
(t)
m )
)− log ( det (Γ(t)e ))]
14: end for
15: Ωselectt = m
16: Ω = Ω/m
17: end for
highest threshold is selected until S relays are selected to forward the signal to all users. The
details of the algorithm are given in Algorithm 10. Comparing the algorithms in Chapter 5,
as the complexity of greedy algorithms is increasing linearly, Algorithm 9 and 10 will have a
much lower complexity and with buffers implemented, Algorithm 8 will have a higher com-
plexity than Algorithm 7. As a conclusion, in terms of complexity Algorithm 9 < Algorithm
10<Algorithm 7<Algorithm 8 for systems with a large number of relays.
5.4 Secrecy Analysis
In this section, we analyze the secrecy performance of a standard MIMO relay system as
well as the proposed buffer-aided MIMO relay system with relaying and jamming function
selection. We carry out the derivation considering a scenario with channel information to
eavesdroppers. The output results indicate the theoretical benchmark for the proposed RJFS
and BF-RJFS algorithms. First let us recall a standard MIMO relay system. According to
[12], the overall secrecy capacity of a single-antenna relay system is given as follows:
Definition 1. With selected relay k and channels from source to relay k, relay k to destina-
tion, source to eavesdropper, relay k to eavesdropper expressed as hsrk , hrkd, hse, hrke respec-
tively, the following equation is obtained:
Ck = max{1
2
log2
min{1 + P‖hsrk‖2, 1 + P‖hrkd‖2}
1 + P‖hse‖2 + P‖hrke‖2
} (5.54)
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Algorithm 10 Greedy-BF-RJFS Algorithm
1: loop
2: Q = Lstate(:, L)
3: for q = 1 : Stotal do
4: if Q(qNi) = 0 then
5: Ω/q = [1 2 · · · q − 1 q + 1 · · ·Stotal]
6: end if
7: end for
8: Ω1 = length(Ω)
9: for r = 1 : M do
10: for k = 1 : Ω1 do
11: Γ
(t)
kr = I + (HkrR
BF
I H
H
kr)
−1(HkrRBFd H
H
kr)
12: Γ
(t)
ke = I +U
H
k R
BF
I
−1
UkR
BF
d
13: [η1r k] = arg maxk∈Ω log
(
det (Γ
(t)
kr )
)− log ( det (Γ(t)ke ))
14: end for
15: Ωtransmitr = k
16: ηLinkII =
∑
η1
17: end for
18: Q = Lstate(:, 1)
19: for q = 1 : Stotal do
20: if Q(qNi) 6= 0 then
21: Ω/q = [1 2 · · · q − 1 q + 1 · · ·Stotal]
22: end if
23: end for
24: Ω2 = length(Ω)
25: for t = 1 : S do
26: for m = 1 : Ω2 do
27: Γ
(t)
m = I + (HmR
m
I H
H
m)
−1(HmRmd H
H
m)
28: Γ
(t)
e = I +U
H
mR
m
I
−1UmRmd
29: [η2r m] = arg maxm∈Ω[log
(
det (Γ
(t)
m )
)− log ( det (Γ(t)e ))]
30: end for
31: Ωreceivet = m
32: ηLinkI =
∑
η2
33: end for
34: end loop
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Equation (5.54) can be rewritten as (5.55) in which the first part calculates the capacity to
the user and the second part the capacity to the eavesdropper.
Ck = max
[
1
2
log2
(
min{1 + P‖hsrk‖2, 1 + P‖hrkd‖2}
)
− 1
2
log2
(
1 + P‖hse‖2 + P‖hrke‖2
)]
(5.55)
In a half-duplex MIMO relay system, based on equations (5.26) and (5.28), the calculation
of the capacity from the source to the relay and to the eavesdropper can be respectively
expressed as:
Ci = max
[
1
2
log2
(
det (I +H
(t)
i UU
HH
(t)
i
H
)
)]
(5.56)
Ce = max
[
1
2
log2
(
det(I + Γ(t)e )
)]
(5.57)
The capacity from relay to destination is given by
Cr = max
[
1
2
log2
(
det(I + Γ(t)r )
)]
. (5.58)
With equations (5.56), (5.57) and (5.58) based on the overall secrecy capacity of a single-
antenna relay system, we present the overall secrecy capacity of a MIMO relay system, which
can be obtained by solving:
CMIMOk = max
[
1
2
log2
(
min{Mi,Mr}
)
− 1
2
log2
(
det(I + Γ(t)e )
)]
, (5.59)
where Mi = det (I +H
(t)
i UU
HH
(t)
i
H
) and Mr = det(I + Γ
(t)
r ). Note that the value
1
2 is due
to the half-duplex system.
Proposition 2. With size L buffers implemented at relay nodes, the secrecy-rate performance
can be improved. The secrecy rate difference changes between 0 to ∆R−BF.
Based on the half-duplex MIMO relay system, in the presence of multiple relay nodes, relay
selection can be implemented prior to transmission. If we use Ψ to represent a set of relay
nodes, based on (5.59), relay selection can be expressed as:
max
i∈Ψ
min{det (I +H(t)i UUHH(t)i
H
), det(I + Γ(t)r )} (5.60)
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Under the condition that det (I +H
(t)
i UU
HH
(t)
i
H
) < det(I + Γ
(t)
r ), relay selection can be
simplified and described by
max
iR∈Ψ
{det (I +H(t)i UUHH(t)i
H
)}, (5.61)
where iR represents the selected relay. In this scenario, the secrecy rate of the relay system
can be obtained by
I
(1)
Relay =
1
2
log2
({det (I +H(t)iRUUHH(t)iRH)})
− 1
2
log2
(
det(I + Γ(t)e )
)
. (5.62)
Under the condition that det (I +H
(t)
i UU
HH
(t)
i
H
) > det(I + Γ
(t)
r,i ), the secrecy rate can be
obtained in the same way and the result is given by
I
(2)
Relay =
1
2
log2
({det(I + Γ(t)r )})
− 1
2
log2
(
det(I + Γ(t)e )
)
. (5.63)
When each relay node is equipped with an infinite buffer, the signals can be stored in
the buffers which means that the signals can wait at the relay nodes until the condition
det (I +H
(t)
i UU
HH
(t)
i
H
) < det(I + Γ
(t)
r ) is satisfied. If we use det(I + Γ
(pt)
r ) to represent
the condition that is experienced in the previous time slot which follows the constraint that
det (I +H
(pt)
i U
(pt)U (pt)
H
H
(pt)
i
H
) > det(I + Γ
(pt)
r ), the expression of the secrecy rate with
infinite buffers is described by
IR−BF =
1
2
log2
({det (I +H(t)iRUUHH(t)iRH)})
− 1
2
log2
({det(I + Γ(pt)r )}). (5.64)
More specifically, with a length L buffer, the condition det (I +H
(t)
i UU
HH
(t)
i
H
) > det(I +
Γ
(t)
r ) will not hold, then the difference of the secrecy rate will be between 0 to IR−BF.
In most scenarios, to avoid the interference in the transmission to or from the relays, a half-
duplex scheme is employed. To release the limit on time slots, an opportunistic scheme can
be applied to the MIMO relay system.
Proposition 3. An opportunistic scheme is capable of improving the secrecy rate as compared
with traditional half-duplex MIMO relay systems.
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According to [15], in the opportunistic scheme we have concurrent transmissions by the source
and relays taking place at the same time-slot. This will result in IRI and as a result its effect
on the relay that receives the source signal must be considered during the opportunistic
scheme. In [15], Nomikos also points out that jamming can be performed at the relay node.
To simplify the proof, we first assume jamming is performed which will enlarge the value
of I
(1)
Relay, I
(2)
Relay and the coefficient of the improvement is mop > 1. The secrecy rate can be
expressed as:
I
(1)
Opportunistic−Relay = mop × I(1)Relay, (5.65)
I
(2)
Opportunistic−Relay = mop × I(2)Relay, (5.66)
where
IOpportunistic−Relay−buffer = mop × IR−BF (5.67)
From this analysis we can verify that the secrecy rate of the opportunistic scheme doubles.
If jamming cannot be performed, based on (5.62), the secrecy rate is expressed as:
I
(1)
Opp−Relay =
mop
2
log2
({det (I + (I +∆′iR)−1H(t)iRUUHH(t)iRH)})
− mop
2
log2
(
det(I + Γ(t)e )
)
, (5.68)
where
∆′iR =
K∑
k=1
HkiRH
(pt)
iR
U (pt)U (pt)
H
H
(pt)
iR
H
HHkiR , (5.69)
which represents IRI. Then the secrecy rate difference between the original relay system with
an opportunistic scheme relay buffer system is obtained by
∆Opp−R−BF =
mop
2
log2
({det (I + (I +∆′iR)−1H(t)iRH(t)iRH)})
− mop
2
log2
({det(I + Γ(pt)r )}). (5.70)
5.4.1 Relaying and Jamming Function Selection (RJFS)
Proposition 4. When SNR → ∞, the secrecy rate COpportunstic−Relay−buffer → ∞ and the
secrecy rate with IRI cancellation outperforms without IRI cancellation.
In all aforementioned systems, we have not taken any jamming signal into consideration.
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In the presence of systems with multiple relay nodes, without obtaining more resources,
some relay nodes can perform the jamming function by introducing jamming signals to the
eavesdroppers. More specifically, the IRI can be applied. In the RJFS algorithm, the selected
relay at the current time interval is the jammer as well as forward relay in the next time
interval. The aim of the RJFS algorithm is to seek the relay that provides the highest
secrecy rate performance.
According to Algorithm 1, the relay selection criterion is given by
φiR = maxiR∈Ψ det
(
(I + Γ(t)e )
−1(I + Γ(t)iR )
)
(5.71)
where iR represents the selected relay. Based on (5.71), the secrecy rate with the selected
relay can be expressed as:
IRJFS−IRI = log2
({det (I + Γ(t)iR )})
− log2
({det(I + Γ(t)e )}). (5.72)
When jamming is performed at the relay nodes, (5.72) can be simplified to
IRJFS−J = log2
({det (I +H(t)iRUUHH(t)iRH)})
− log2
({det(I + Γ(t)e )}). (5.73)
Equation (5.73) was obtained in our previous study [82] when SNR→∞. Comparing (5.72)
with (5.73), we can have IRJFS−J > IRJFS−IRI which is indicated in Fig. 5.6.
5.4.2 Buffer-aided Relaying and Jamming Function Selection (BF-RJFS)
Proposition 5. According to Proposition 2, the secrecy-rate performance can be improved
with buffers. This can also be applied to the RJFS algorithm. In the IC scenario, when more
power is allocated to the transmitter the secrecy rate will suffer from a dramatic decrease in
the existing IRI scenario.
In the buffer-aided RJFS algorithm, the relay selection and jamming selection can be imple-
mented simultaneously with the following selection criterion:
φiR = maxiR∈Ψ det
(
(I + Γ(t)e )
−1(I + Γ(t)iR )
)
(5.74)
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and
φn = maxn∈Ψ det
(
(I + Γ(t)e )
−1(I + Γ(t)n )
)
, (5.75)
where in both transmissions we can achieve high secrecy rate performance with separate
selection from source to relays and relays to destinations. Considering power allocation, with
the parameter η indicating the power allocated to the transmitter, we assume the power
allocated to the transmitter is ηP and the power allocated to the relays is (2 − η)P . When
η → 0, more power will be allocated to the transmitter, according to:
I
(1)
BF−RJFS−IRI = log2
({det (I + Γ(t)iR )})
− log2
({det(I + Γ(t)e )}) (5.76)
and
I
(2)
BF−RJFS−IRI = log2
({det (I + Γ(t)n )})
− log2
({det(I + Γ(t)e )}), (5.77)
where the secrecy rate I
(1)
BF−RJFS−IRI will have an increase, while I
(2)
BF−RJFS−IRI will have a
reduction. As a result, the overall secrecy rate suffers from a decrease. More specifically,
with less power allocated in the relay or the jammer, the IRI that acts as a jamming signal
to the eavesdropper will have less effect on the contribution to the secrecy rate. Then the
overall secrecy rate will have a dramatic decrease.
If jamming is performed, according to (5.78) and (5.79), we have
I
(1)
BF−RJFS−J = log2
({det (I +H(t)iRUUHH(t)iRH)})
− log2
({det(I + Γ(t)e )}) (5.78)
and
I
(2)
BF−RJFS−J = log2
({det (I + Γ(t)n )})
− log2
({det(I + Γ(t)e )}), (5.79)
where more power is allocated to the transmitter and the secrecy rate I
(1)
BF−RJFS−J and
I
(2)
BF−RJFS−J is less affected than in the scenario with IRI.
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5.4.3 Greedy Algorithm in Relay Selection
Proposition 6. With high SNRs, the greedy algorithm cooperation with the buffer-aided RJFS
algorithm can achieve almost the same secrecy rate performance with a dramatic decrease in
the computational complexity.
According to (5.42), the total number of sets for an exhaustive search can be expressed as:
Ωexhaustive =
Stotal!
(Stotal − S)!S! . (5.80)
In the proposed greedy search algorithm, the search is implemented in the remaining relay
nodes so that the total number of visited sets in the greedy search is given by
Ωgreedy = Stotal + Stotal − 1 + · · ·+ Stotal − S + 1 = StotalS − S(S − 1)
2
(5.81)
Based on (5.80) and (5.81), for a certain number of selected relay nodes S, when the total
number of relay nodes M increases, the total number of visited sets for the exhaustive search
is much higher than those for the greedy search, that is Ωexhaustive >> Ωgreedy.
5.5 Simulation Results
In this section, we assess the secrecy-rate performance of the proposed RJFS and BF-RJFS
algorithms through simulations for the downlink of a multiuser relay system where the relays
are equipped with buffers. In a single-antenna scenario, the transmitter is equipped with
3 antennas to broadcast the signal to 3 legitimate users through multiple single-antenna
relays in the presence of 3 eavesdroppers equipped with a single antenna. In the MIMO
scenario, the transmitter is equipped with 6 antennas and each user, eavesdropper and relay
has 2 antennas. When the buffer is implemented at the relay node, the size is set to store 4
symbols unless otherwise specified. In both scenarios, a zero-forcing precoding technique is
implemented at the transmitter and we assume that the channel for each user is uncorrelated
with the remaining channels and the channel gains are generated following independent and
identically distributed complex circular Gaussian random variables with zero mean and unit
variance.
We have also examined a scenario with correlated channels, where the correlated channel
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matrix is described by
Hc = Rr
1
2HRt
1
2 (5.82)
where Rr and Rt are receive and transmit covariance matrices with Tr(Rr) = Nr and
Tr(Rt) = Nt. Both Rr and Rt are positive semi-definite Hermitian matrices.
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Figure 5.3: Secrecy rate performance of relay selection techniques in uncorrelated channels.
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Figure 5.4: Secrecy rate performance of relay selection techniques in uncorrelated channels.
In Figs. 5.3 and 5.4 we assess the secrecy rate performance of the schemes under consideration
in uncorrelated and correlated channels, respectively. The results indicate that the proposed
relay selection criteria can improve the secrecy rate performance in both scenarios but cor-
related channels contribute to to the degradation of the performance of all algorithms, as
expected. Among all the investigated relay selection criteria, the S-SR criterion achieves the
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best performance and does not require the channel state information to the eavesdroppers.
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Figure 5.5: Secrecy rate performance with different buffer sizes in uncorrelated channels
In Fig. 5.5, the secrecy rate performance and the theoretical expression obtained in (5.70)
are evaluated with no buffer system, infinite buffer size and finite buffers of size L = 10.
The theoretical curve are obtained with the derived secrecy rate difference ∆Opp−R−BF in
(5.70) and the secrecy rate curves are obtained by simulations. According to Fig. 5.5, when
the buffer size is increased, the secrecy rate will have an improvement and get close to the
theoretical curve. Moreover, the parameter ∆Opp−R−BF in (5.70) illustrated with the double
arrowed line agrees well with difference between the simulated curves.
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Figure 5.6: Multi-user system scenario
In Figure 5.6, in a single-antenna scenario, the secrecy-rate performance with the proposed
algorithm is better than that with the conventional algorithm. With IC, the secrecy-rate
performance is better than the one without IC, as expected. Compared with the single-
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antenna scenario, the multiuser MIMO system contributes to the improvement in the secrecy
rate as verified by the curves in 5.6. In particular, the proposed RJFS algorithm with the
selected set of buffer-aided relays (SBF) selection policy is better than the conventional
buffer-aided relay selection (BF).
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Figure 5.7: Secrecy rate performance with power allocation in IRI cancellation (IC) scenario
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Figure 5.8: Secrecy rate performance with power allocation in existing of IRI scenario
In Figure 5.7 and Figure 5.8, a power allocation technique is considered and the parameter
η indicates the power allocated to the transmitter. If we assume in the equal power scenario
that the power allocated to the transmitter as well as the relays are both P , then the power
allocated to the transmitter is ηP and the power allocated to the relays is (2 − η)P . In
Figure 5.7 and Figure 5.8 we can see that with more power allocated to the transmitter the
5.5. Simulation Results 114
secrecy-rate performance will become worse. Comparing these two figures, when η < 1.5 the
secrecy-rate performance in the IC scenario is better than that without IC. When η > 1.5
and without IC, the secrecy rate is improved.
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Figure 5.9: Number of visited sets for the exhaustive and greedy searches
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Figure 5.10: Secrecy rate performance with an exhaustive search and the proposed greedy
algorithm
In Figure 5.9 with a fixed number of relays, the computational complexity for the exhaustive
and the greedy searches with the RJFS and BF-RJFS algorithms is examined. The results
show that the proposed greedy algorithms are substantially simpler than those with the
exhaustive search and is suitable for scenarios with a higher number of relays. In Figure 5.10
a comparison between the exhaustive search and the proposed greedy algorithms is carried
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out. The results show that the proposed greedy algorithms can approach the same secrecy
rate performance with a much lower complexity than the exhaustive search-based techniques.
5.6 Summary
In this chapter, we have proposed algorithms to select a set of relay nodes to enhance the
legitimate users’ transmission and another set of relay nodes to perform jamming of the
eavesdroppers. The proposed RJFS and BF-RJFS selection algorithms can exploit the use
of the buffers in the relay nodes that may remain silent during the data transmission. Sim-
ulation results show that the proposed BF-RJFS can provide a significantly better secrecy
rate performance in a multiuser MIMO relay system than existing algorithms for buffer-aided
relay systems. In the future, buffer-aided relay nodes will be a key technique for obtaining
substantial gains in secrecy rate along with other powerful techniques such physical-layer key
generation strategies.
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6.1 Conclusions
This thesis investigates the physical-layer security with downlink multiuser MIMO channels.
Under the total power constraint, the secrecy capacity is expressed with channel matrix and
covariance matrix [18]. Due to the characteristics of the expression, traditional optimization
techniques for convex or concave functions are no longer useful to obtain the secrecy capacity.
Our research is then concentrate on the approaches getting optimal transmit covariance
matrix.
To start with, some work [17; 10] suggest that precoding techniques can be employed to
obtain a sub-optimal result at the transmitter. As illustrated in the literature, non-linear
precoding techniques are developed by mitigating interferences and noise effect to achieve
the channel capacity. Following the idea, with equal power assumption, non-linear pre-
coding SO-THP+GMI is proposed in the wiretap MIMO channel to obtain a sub-optimal
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transmit covariance matrix. The corresponding secrecy rate performance has an outstand-
ing improvement than conventional precoding techniques. Furthermore, extended versions
such as SO-THP+S-GMI which is aiming at reducing computational complexity and LR-SO-
THP+S-GMI which is capable of achieving full diversity are developed by considering QR
decomposition and lattice-reduction respectively in the original developed SO-THP+GMI
algorithm [82].
After the study of precoding techniques, to compensate the signal attenuation and provide
better spatial application, relays are used to assist the transmission. In the presence of
multiple relays, relay selection is a critical technique to maintain optimal transmission per-
formance in terms of a particular metric [42]. As to the physical-layer security, max-ratio is
considering eavesdropper’s channel coefficients or statistical channel gain at the transmitter
to perform a relay selection aiming at improve secrecy rate performance [12]. Based on the
idea, we employ different criteria such as SINR or secrecy rate (SR) to achieve better secrecy
rate performance. The SINR and SR criteria efficient in improving secrecy rate, however
the requirement of channel information to eavesdroppers is hard to achieve. Motivated by
releasing the requirement, S-SINR and S-SR criteria are developed to maintain the secrecy
rate performance without CSI to eavesdroppers. Thus the optimal relay selection can be
implemented to contribute to the secrecy rate performance in MIMO relay system.
Developed from relay system, buffers are employed at each relay to make full use of spatial
and temporal advantage [13]. Concurrently, opportunistic scheme is performed instead of
half-duplex scheme to further improve the throughput of the system [14]. Assisted with
investigated relay selection criteria, novel opportunistic relaying and jamming schemes RJFS
and BF-RJFS are proposed by considering jamming technique in the opportunistic scheme.
Furthermore, the effect of different power allocation are investigated in terms of secrecy rate
performance. At last, due to the high complexity caused by exhaustive search of the relays,
greedy search is employed in the relay selection procedure [80].
6.2 Further Work
The future work is consist of two parts. The first one is the continuation and the other is
developing new techniques to improve physical-layer security performance in wireless net-
works.
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6.2.1 Continuation
Based on our research, the optimal transmit covariance matrix can be an tough but interesting
aspect. Secondly, the relay systems can be extended to multi-layer relay systems or ad-hoc
systems. Concurrently, some latest techniques such as massive MIMO, lattice construction
are also drawing more attention in the physical-layer research.
6.2.2 Ideas
As an conclusion, current works are exploring the technique which exploits the differences of
channel characteristics between the main channel and wire-tap channel.
My ideas of the future developments about physical-layer security can be located into two
critical aspects. The first one is following traditional encryption techniques. Physical-layer
key generation, for instance, is a technique generating keys with different channel character-
istics. With shared keys between transmitter and receiver, the wireless transmission can be
secured. In [84], different passive and active attacks are analyzed with the consideration of
applying physical-layer key generation, A new key generation scheme using random probing
signals, and combining user generated randomness and channel randomness, is introduced
as a countermeasure against active attacks. Also in [85], a secret key generation based on
tracking channel evolution in time division duplex systems is introduced and the information
theoretic limits of this key generation schemes are investigated.
Another idea is hiding the transmission which means the eavesdropper is unaware of the
transmission or in another word don’t know which transmitter to eavesdrop. Although this
is even harder to achieve than ensuring secure transmission, if the eavesdropper does not
know the transmission occurs, the transmission is definitely secure. To implement the idea,
with multiple base stations, distributed algorithms would be a good idea. By transmitting the
signals with multiple based stations, it would be rather difficult for the eavesdropper to detect
all the transmitted signals. Then distributed algorithms can be employed to accomplish the
task of hiding the transmission.
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If we consider ρA = HbaQsH
H
ba and (Q
′
s)
−1Qs = ρ/(1− ρ)I, (3.38) can be rewritten as
log(det(I + ρA))− log(det(I + ρ/(1− ρ)I), (A.1)
Here we first take the derivative of log(det(I + ρA)) with respect to ρ and assume that A
is an m×m matrix. The eigenvalues of the matrix I + ρA are 1 + ρa1, 1 + ρa2, · · · 1 + ρam.
The eigenvalues of the matrix A(I + ρA)−1 are a11+ρa1 , ,
a2
1+ρa2
, · · · am1+ρam . With these
relations, we have
det(I + ρA) = (1 + ρa1)(1 + ρa2) · · · (1 + ρam), (A.2)
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and
Tr(A(I + ρA)−1) =
a1
1 + ρa1
+
a2
1 + ρa2
+ · · ·+ am
1 + ρam
. (A.3)
The derivative of log(det(I + ρA)) with respect to ρ can be expressed as
d{log(det(I + ρA))}
dρ
=
d{log((1 + ρa1)(1 + ρa2) · · · (1 + ρam))}
dρ
,
=
d{log(1 + ρa1)}
dρ
+
d{log(1 + ρa2)}
dρ
+ · · ·+ d{log(1 + ρam)}
dρ
,
= (
a1
1 + ρa1
+
a2
1 + ρa2
+ · · ·+ am
1 + ρam
) ln(2),
= Tr(A(I + ρA)−1) ln(2).
(A.4)
Similarly, the derivative of log(det(I + ρ/(1− ρ)I) with respect to ρ is given by Tr(I) ln(2).
The optimal value of ρ can be obtained by calculating
Tr(A(I + ρA)−1) ln(2)− Tr(I) ln(2) = 0 (A.5)
which is equivalent to
(1− ρ)A = I. (A.6)
By substituting A in 1ρHbaQsH
H
ba, (A.6) can be rewritten as
(
1
ρ
− 1)HbaQsHHba = I. (A.7)
Given the constraints Tr(Qs) = ρEs and Hba ∈ CN (0, 1), in the simulation scenario, we can
solve (A.7) as
4(
1
ρ
− 1)ρ2 = 1. (A.8)
The optimal value is achieved at ρ = 0.5. However, due to the existence of Gaussian noise, the
optimal value is shifted. Based on (A.5), we focus on the first term Tr(A(I + ρA)−1) ln(2).
It can be rewritten as Tr((A−1)−1(I + ρA)−1) ln(2). Finally, we have
Tr(A−1 + ρI) ln(2), (A.9)
when considering Gaussian noise, A = 1
σ2nρ
HbaQsH
H
ba. Here σ
2
n represents the variance of
the noise. When the signal variance is set to 1, we can have σ2n < 1. If we use the matrix Na
to represent the effect of noise, we can employ A = 1ρHbaQsH
H
ba +Na, where the elements
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in Na are positive. Substituting A by
1
ρHbaQsH
H
ba +Na, (A.6) can be obtained as
(
1
ρ
− 1)(HbaQsHHba +Na) = I. (A.10)
Comparing (A.7) with (A.10), it can be verified that the optimal value of (A.10) is achieved
at a higher value of ρ which is 0.6 in our simulation.
Glossary of Terms
AF Amplify-and-Forward
AN Artificial Noise
BD Block Diagonalization
BER Bit Error Rate
BF-RJFS Buffer-aided Relaying and Jamming Function Selection
CSI Channel State Information
DF Decode-and-Forward
FLOPS Floating-Point Operations Per Second
GMI Generalized MMSE channel inversion
IC Inter-Relay Interference Cancellation
LR Lattice Reduction
MIMO Multiple-Input Multiple-Output
MISO Multiple-Input Single-Output
MMSE Minimum Mean Square Error
RJFS Relaying and Jamming Function Selection
SIMO Single-Input Multiple-Output
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SINR Signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio
SISO Single-Input Single-Output
SNR Signal-to-noise ratio
SO Successive Optimization
SR Secrecy Rate
SVD Singular Value Decomposition
THP Tomlinson-Harashima Precoding
ZF Zero Forcing
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